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Abstract 
The physics of complex adaptive systems has attracted much at tent ion in re-
cent years. Typical ly these systems involve a populat ion of agents competing 
for l imi ted resources. In this thesis, two types of systems are studied using 
different models. The first type of systems involves several variations on the 
minor i ty game (MG), which is a model in which agents compete to be in a 
minor i ty group. The effects of using different payoff functions in the M G are 
studied numerically. The dependence of the standard deviation (SD) of the 
attendance as a function of the memory size m is found to be the same as in 
the basic MG. The crowd-anticrowd theory is used to explain the robustness 
of the m-dependence of the SD, thus giving an analytical explanation to the 
numerical results. We also study the herd formation and informat ion trans-
mission w i th in a population in the MG. I t is a more realistic model than the 
basic M G in that agents may be affected more by the ones they know. Short-
range interactions among agents are introduced through their imi ta t ion of the 
best-performing agent's action or strategy w i th in a connected group of agents. 
Simulation results indicate that imitat ions give a better performance of the 
population as a whole for small m (efficient phase). The second type of sys-
tems involves several cellular automaton traffic flow models. A one-lane model 
w i th anticipation effect is studied both numerically and analytically using the 
Fukui-Ishibashi (FI) type of dynamics. The anticipation of the movement of 
the car ahead is very common in real traffic flow and we found an enhance-
ment of flux. A simple mean field theory is developed and results are in good 
i 
agreement w i t h numerical results. The traffic flow models w i t h global infor-
mat ion announced to the drivers are also studied. Based on the informat ion, 
drivers choose to enter one of two possible routes f rom a star t ing point to 
a destination. Bo th the Fukui-Ishibashi (FI) and Nagel-Schreckenberg (NS) 
types of dynamics are studied through numerical simulations. A simple mean 
field theory is developed for the F I model. Results are in qual i tat ive agree-
ment w i t h numerical results. The announcement of two kinds of informat ion, 
the most recent transit times of the routes and average speeds on the routes, 
is considered. Results suggested that announcing the average speeds is more 
efficient in terms of the usage of the routes. Other modifications on the models 
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Complex adaptive systems typical ly consist of a number of agents making 
decisions based on globally shared informat ion in order to compete for l imi ted 
resources. The global informat ion is created by the action of the populat ion 
itself. Very often, complex behavior results f rom very simple rules for the 
behavior of the participants. These systems have attracted much attent ion 
in recent years. In thesis, we w i l l study models of these systems w i th in the 
contexts of econophysics [1] and traffic flow problems [2, 3 . 
In the area of econophysics, we wi l l be mainly concerned w i t h the Minor i ty 
Game (MG) introduced by Challet and Zhang [4, 5, 6]. The M G offers a 
simple paradigm for the complex financial market. The aim of the M G is 
to model a competing populat ion where there are always more losers than 
winners. The agents in the population adapt the system by switching f rom 
one strategy to another, based on the performance of their strategies. There is 
no other news in the market to the agents besides their own trading activity. 
Thus, the agents only learn from their own experience wi thout believing in 
any theory. The agents can learn and adapt the market to maximize their 
profit. Therefore, the M G constitutes a simple, yet not- tr iv ial , model w i th 
strong feedback. The basic M G gives a str iking features in the non-monotonic 
variation in the standard deviation for the fluctuations [7]. Based on the MG, 
many theories and variations of the M G have been studied. 
1 
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We w i l l also study models of traff ic flow. Nowadays, traff ic flow networks 
become more and more complex. A n efficient t ranspor ta t ion system is essential 
for the modern wor ld. Many researchers, inc luding physicists, have worked on 
traff ic flow problems [3, 8]. We w i l l study the traff ic flow problems using cellular 
automata (CA) models [9] to explore the under ly ing principles of vehicular 
traff ic flow. I n par t icu lar , we w i l l ma in ly study two models, namely the Nagel-
Schreckenberg (NS) [10] and the Fukui-Ishibashi (F I ) [11] models. The effects 
of drivers' ant ic ipat ion of the movement of the car ahead w i l l be considered. 
The effects of drivers' decisions when we have two routes f rom one place to 
another w i l l be studied. 
The plan of the thesis is as follows. I n Chapter 2, we review the model and 
basic features of the basic M G . Some modif icat ions and theories of the M G are 
also reviewed in Chapter 2. A qual i tat ive explanat ion of the M G w i t h different 
payoff functions is proposed in Chapter 3. I n Chapter 4，the M G w i t h N-sided 
im i ta t i on is studied numerically. A review on one-lane traff ic CA models is 
given in Chapter 5. I n Chapter 6, we study the effect of one-lane model w i t h 
ant ic ipat ion. Bo th numerical ly and analyt ical results are proposed for the F I 
dynamics. I n Chapter 7，we study two-route models w i t h global in format ion 
using bo th NS and F I dynamics. A n analyt ical theory is proposed for the case 
of F I dynamics. A conclusion is given in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 2 
The Minority Game: A Review 
Recently, many physicists are at t racted to the new area of study of Econo-
physics [1]. I t concerns the explorat ion of economics and finance-related prob-
lems f rom a physicist's point of view. I n the past few years a large number 
of research papers and some new journals devoted to econophysics have been 
published [1, 12]. A l though this t rend has started only a few years, interesting 
and useful contr ibut ions have emerged f rom physicists' work, and the growing 
significance of the area is at t ract ing much attent ion. W h a t are the advan-
tages of physicists working in econophysics? As financial markets give a huge 
amount of data, t rad i t ional ly trained economists may not have the skills to 
analyze them. Physicists have some skills that can be applied to analyze the 
basic mechanism in a market and how to model a market. 
The two main approaches of econophysics are: the analysis of empir ical fi-
nancial data and the numerical modeling of the market. The former is main ly 
the analysis of the time-series of the price return in the stock market, since 
there are much data in the financial market that we are not understood. One 
of the most basic properties in a market is the d is t r ibut ion of the price fluc-
tuations. I t is found that the dist r ibut ion in real market converges to a stable 
Levy dist r ibut ion [13，14], but not the normal distr ibut ion. Levy d is t r ibut ion 
is a d ist r ibut ion that has a narrow peak at small fluctuations and there is a 
ta i l at large fluctuations which is fatter than the guassian distr ibut ion. Such 
3 
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analysis gives that the d is t r ibut ion may obey a power law behavior [1, 15]. In 
short, although we cannot get a future economy theory as quant i tat ive and 
predictive as physical laws, we can analysis and understand some basic phe-
nomena of the financial market qualitatively. We shall l im i t ourselves to the 
discussions on some simple models of market. 
To understand the financial market, we should look at the behavior of the 
agents first. There are a large number of indiv idual agents part ic ipat ing in 
the market and they have their own decision making alternatives. Agents w i l l 
use the public price history, which is a result of the aggregate activi ty, to 
make their decisions. Thus, the “ agent-based" models, models considering the 
human agents, have been used to investigate the features of the real market. 
The t radi t ional economic point of view is that the agents are all completely 
rat ional and well-informed, such that the market is always in an equi l ibr ium 
state. More realistically, we have to consider other factors and the i r rat ional i ty 
of the agents. Therefore, we study the inherent dynamics of the market such 
that the agents do not believe in any theory, they only learn f rom their own 
experience and there is no other news in the market besides their own t rading 
activity. The agents use their strategies t ry ing to maximize their profit . How 
can they benefit themselves? Since each agent has different perception f rom 
others, the agents can learn by t r ia l and error and adapt to the actions of the 
other agents. Therefore, there is a heterogeneous strategy distr ibut ion among 
the agents. The agents learn inductively w i th the attempt to maximize their 
profit. 
We need some concrete models to move on. A simple and metaphoric model 
of the agents to continuously adapt the action of other is the evolutionary 
game theory in Ref. [16]. In 1994, Ar thur advocated the so-called “ inductive 
thinking" approach [17]. The idea is that since an agent cannot use any theory 
to decide her own decision, her only choice is to learn from her own experience 
and t ry to adapt to the market. Arthur 's El Farol problem inspired Challet 
Chapter 2 The Minority Game: .4 Revitu 5 
and Zhang to propose a competit ive agent-based model, namely the Minor i t y 
Game (MG) in 1997, which is intended to reveal the r ich intr insic market 
dynamics and some general issues [4 . 
Keep in mind that we need a model as simple as possible, in order to say 
something general. The M G is a simple model. Suppose that there are N (odd) 
agents playing the game. A t each t ime step, each agent has to choose to be in 
group 0 or group 1. The agents have to compete to be in the minor i ty group, 
and a reward w i l l be given to the winners. For those agents in the major i t y 
group, they get nothing. The only and global informat ion for the agents is the 
time-series of the past record, which only tells the winning group wi thout the 
actual attendance in the winning group. Generally, the analyzing power of the 
agents is l imited. Thus, each agent decides based only on the m most recent 
outcomes. Each agent has s strategies based on which she makes the decision. 
A strategy is a look-up table of the prediction of next action, which maps every 
bi t -str ing of length m to an action of the agent. W i t h the possible outcomes of 
2 groups, there are 2爪 different possible strings of m outcomes and thus there 
are tota l ly different strategies. The learning process is that every agent 
assigns a v i r tua l point to those strategies that would have predicted the correct 
outcome, no matter the strategies were actually used or not. The agents use 
the strategy w i th the best performance, i.e., the one w i th the highest v i r tua l 
point, to decide the next move. 
Interestingly, the M G gives amazingly complex and rich results. The M G 
may be interpreted as the buy and sell processes in the stock market. I f there 
are more buyers than sellers, the price wi l l increase and the buyers must pay 
more money. On the other hand, i f there are more sellers than buyers, then 
the price falls and the sellers wi l l take less profit. Thus, i t is an advantage to 
be in the minor i ty group. Therefore, the M G can be regarded as a toy model 
of the financial market. The dynamics associated w i th minor i ty membership 
plays an important role in a complex adaptive system consisting of competing 
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agents. As a result, many modif icat ions and extensions of the basic M G have 
been investigated. 
The interesting features i n M G immediate ly inv i ted several variat ions. The 
thermal model of M G ( T M G ) proposed by Cavagna et al [18] extends the basic 
M G to a continuous space. I n T M G , the agents do not always fol low the best-
performing strategy. Instead, they have a certain probabi l i ty of using the other 
strategies. A temperature T is introduced to describe the probabi l i ty , w i t h the 
high temperature l im i t corresponding to equal probabi l i ty of using any one of 
the s strategies. I t is found tha t the standard deviat ion (SD) of the attendance 
in a part icular group, say group 0，which is related to the price vo la t i l i t y in a 
f inancial market, is effectively reduced when T is introduced. Features in T M G 
have led to the use of ideas in spin glass system. Challet et al. [19, 20，21 
studied the M G as a spin glass system and derived an analyt ic expression of the 
SD, w i t h results in excellent agreement w i t h numerical simulations of T M G . 
There are also variations in extending the M G to the mul t ip le choice mi-
nor i ty game ( M C M G ) in which there are more than two choices available to 
the agents. D'hulst and Rodgers proposed a three-sided M G [22], where the 
th i rd alternative may represent an inactive trader or buying another k ind of 
commodity. Ein-Dor et al. [23] proposed a /c-sided M G w i th i n the framework 
of neural network. Chow and Chau [24] introduced a simple way to model the 
M G w i th mul t ip le choices in which the size of the strategy does not grow as 
rapidly as in the M G w i th m. 
The basic M G does not incorporate the evolutionary features of the agents 
and the local interactions between the agents. Johnson et al. [25] proposed a 
modif icat ion of M G in which the strategy of the agents w i l l evolve throughout 
the game. I t is called the Evolut ion Minor i ty Game (EMG) . In E M G , there 
is only one strategy for all agents in the whole population. Each agent has a 
probabi l i ty p of fol lowing the prediction of the strategy, and a probabi l i ty 1 —p 
of making the opposite prediction. Each agent's p evolves as the game proceeds. 
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A n interesting feature is that the d is t r ibut ion of p-value indicates tha t cautions 
agents tend to be rare. Lo et al. [26] proposed an analyt ical theory that 
successfully explained the dist r ibut ion of p. D'hulst and Rodgers studied a 
version of E M G w i th heterogeneous strategy d ist r ibut ion [27]. Challet and 
Zhang [5] studied a version of M G model in which the worst-performing agent 
is el iminated after a certain t ime and a new agent w i th a new set of s strategies 
is introduced. Al lowing for evolution in the M G has attracted much at tent ion 
28, 29, 30 . 
Paczuski et al. [31] introduced a M G w i th in the context of a Kauf fman 
network [32], for which the network does not organize. Each agent is connected 
to a number of randomly picked agents. A n agent only knows the actions of 
her K connected agents and makes her decision according to the last action of 
the K agents. Af ter a period of t ime, the worst agent is allowed to change her 
connections and strategies. I t is found that the network evolves to a stationary 
state. Kalinowski et al. [33] proposed a modified MG, called “M ino r i t y Game 
w i th local information" (MGLI ) , in which the agents are connected in the form 
of a circle and an agent only knows the previous decisions of her neighbors. 
Moelbut et al [34] introduced a " local minor i ty game" (LMG) . In LMG，each 
agent is assigned to belong to a subset where she has to compete in the minor i ty 
group w i th in this smaller subset of agents. The results are some what different 
f rom the basic MG. Slanina [35, 36] proposed a M G w i th imi ta t ion among 
neighboring agents and Quan et al. [37] proposed a similar game for EMG. 
These modifications indicated that imi ta t ion may lead to enchancement of the 
success rate, when compared w i th the basic M G and EMG. 
Apart f rom variations on MG, physicists also want to explain the behavior 
of the M G in detail. Savit et al. [7] found that there is a periodicity in the 
attendance time-series in the small m regime. As m increases, the periodicity 
vanishes. Also, i t is found that when m is small, the information created by 
the agents w i l l be "used up" by other agents, and no agent can take advantage 
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of the others. The small m phase is called the efficient phase. When m is large, 
the in format ion created by the agents is not "used up，，，then the performance 
of an agent depends on the set of strategies she has. A better strategy would 
lead to a higher w inn ing probabi l i ty. This phase is called the inefficient phase. 
Also, Savit et al suggested that in format ion is hidden in bi t -str ings of length 
longer than m in the efficient phase. I f there is an agent w i t h a larger "b ra in 
size"，she can make use of the informat ion. 
Cavagna [38] argued that the dynamics of the history is irrelevant. He 
showed that when a random history is used instead of the actual outcome, the 
SD as a funct ion of m remains the same. Cavagna argued tha t the features 
of the M G are not affected even i f the agents do not decide using the actual 
history, and the features main ly depend on provid ing the agents w i t h the 
identical global informat ion. Therefore, the "memory" of the agents is claimed 
to be irrelevant. I t was pointed out that conclusion is not generally correct 
39]. The “ memory size" (m) is significant in the d is t r ibut ion of strategies 
among the agents [39]. Challet et al. [4] pointed out the memory is relevant 
when m is large. 
Johnson et al. [40] studied a M G w i th two types of agents. One type has a 
larger m and they are the "smar t " agents. Another type has a smaller m and 
they are the "dumb" agents. I t is found that the "smar t " agents can indeed 
gain more, and the success rate of the “ dumb" agents may be increased due 
to the presence of the “ smart" agents. 
Johnson et al. [41] also analyzed quant i tat ively the SD in terms of the 
“crowd effect，，among the agents. There is a m in imum in the SD, which occurs 
at a part icular m. I t is due to the presence of crowds and anticrowds of similar 
sizes in the population. Recently, Hart et al. [42，43] analyt ical ly explained the 
min imum using the ，，crowd effect". Chau et al [44] explained the m in imum 
in terms of the the cooperation of the agents and the change of the strategy 
space size in M C M G . 
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In this Chapter, we define the basic model of M G in Sec. 2.1 and review 
some basic features in M G in Sec. 2.2. I n Sec. 2.3，we introduce the crowd-
ant icrowd theory [42, 41] of the MG. Final ly, we review some variat ions on 
M G in Sec. 2.4. 
2.1 The basic MG 
The basic minor i ty game (MG) model proposed by Challet and Zhang [4] is 
a milestone for the study of a complex adaptive system. A n odd number 
of N agents play the game. The agents have to choose to j o i n one of two 
possible groups, say group 0 and group 1. Each agent in the minor i t y group 
at a t ime step, is awarded a point . Agents belong to the ma jo r i t y group get 
nothing. There is a global in format ion accessible to al l agents. The agents 
use the in format ion as the only input to make their decisions. The global 
in format ion is the time-series of the history, which indicates the series of the 
winning group, 0 or 1, as the game proceeds. Each agent decides based on 
the history of the m most recent t ime steps. The parameter m is sometimes 
referred to as the memory size. For instance, i f the time-series of the history 
at t ime t is - ••00110110，then agents w i t h m = 3 w i l l have 110 as the input at 
t ime t, and O i l at t ime t — 1, etc. A n agent decides based on the predict ion 
of a strategy, which maps the history to an action. More expl ici t ly, a strategy 
is a look-up table of 2爪 rows and 2 columns. The left column contains all 
possible bit-str ings of history. Each entry in the r ight column is the predict ion, 
either 0 or 1, of the strategy. A n example of a strategy w i t h memory size m = 3 
is shown in Table 2.1. 
A t each turn, agents look up their strategies and decide the actions accord-
ing to the predictions of their strategies w i th the corresponding history at that 
turn. Note that al l the strategies used by the agents have the same memory 
m. As m increases, the to ta l number of strategies increases rapidly. The to ta l 
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Table 2.1: A strategy for m = 3. 
number of strategies is for a given m. A t the beginning of the game, each 
agent randomly picks s strategies f rom the strategies，with repetit ions al-
lowed. For s > 1, agents can adapt to the environment by choosing different 
strategies at different moments of the game. The strategies are evaluated by 
their performance from the beginning of the game to the present. A n strategy 
is assigned a v i r tua l point i f i t would have given the correct output . The agents 
use the strategy w i th the highest accumulated v i r tua l points for her action. 
Ini t ial ly, the v i r tua l point of each strategy and the wealth of each agent are 
set to 0. As the environment is created by the collective action of the agents 
themselves and the v i r tua l point mechanism is based on the environment, the 
M G has a strong feedback. The agents are learning f rom their experience 
throughout the game. Moreover, the population is heterogeneous w i th agents 
having different set of strategies. This resembles a society in which people 
th ink differently. The number of strategies per agent s represents the abi l i ty 
of adaptation of the agents. 
This model is very simple, but i t is relevant to the dynamics of the biological 
or social system. I t is inspired by the El Parol problem [45]. What is the El 
Parol problem? El Parol is a bar in Sante Fe，New Mexico, which plays some 
Irish folk music in every Thursday evening. Many people in the city want to 
attend the bar to listen to the music, but there is a l imi ted number of seats. 
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I f there are too many patrons, then they wi l l not be able to enjoy the music 
since there is too much noise. In the MG, one can let 0 represent the action of 
going to the bar, and 1 represent staying home. Thus, one is awarded a point 
i f one attends the bar on a night that less than half of the agents attend. On 
the other hand, one is also awarded a point i f one stays home on a night that 
more than half of the agents attend the bar. 
2.2 The basic features of MG 
We studied the basic M G numerically. Since the standard deviation of the at-
tendance in a part icular group (SD), say group 0, is analogous to the volat i l i ty 
in a stock market, i t is important to study the SD as a funct ion of m in the 
MG. The SD not only represents the risk suffered by the agents, but also the 
global u t i l i t y of the market. Figure 2.1 shows the SD as a funct ion of m for 
32 independent runs for a M G w i th N = 101 and s = 2. The SD decreases 
w i th m for small m and then i t reaches a min imum at m = 6. I t rises for 
m > 6 and converges to a saturated value at large m. I t is found that the SD 
are different for different runs. I t is because the strategy distr ibutions are not 
identical for different runs. However, the spread in different runs decreases as 
m increases. For large m (m > 10), the results in different runs converge to 
a particular value. This particular value is called the random coin-toss l imi t . 
In this l im i t , all the agents are playing the game as i f they act randomly. The 
variance of the attendance in this l imi t is N/4, w i th the standard deviation 
being \ / ]V /2 . For N = 101, SD 〜5 for large m. More explicit ly, we show the 
attendance distr ibut ion for different regimes of m in Figs. 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. 
Figure 2.2 shows the attendance distr ibut ion in the small m (m = 3) regime. 
I t is found that the distr ibut ion spreads over a wide range, thus leading to a 
large SD. The min imum SD is at m = 6. Figure 2.3 shows the attendance 
distr ibut ion at m = 6. Figure 2.3 shows a symmetric and thinner than normal 
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Figure 2.1: The standard deviation SD as a function of m in MG with N = 101 
and 5 = 2. Results of 32 independents runs are shown. 
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Figure 2.2: The attendance distribution in a particular group for m = 3. Other 
parameters are N — 101, 5 = 2. 
distr ibut ion, thus leading to a SD smaller than the coin-toss l im i t . Moreover, 
the attendance lies mainly between 45 to 55. Figure 2.4 shows the distr ibut ion 
in the large m l im i t . The distr ibut ion is similar to the normal distr ibut ion. 
The spread of the attendance in large m is wider than that in m = 6 (the 
min imum SD). From the three figures, the mean attendance in any group, 0 or 
1, is iV/2 and the two groups are symmetrical. Thus, the SD directly reflects 
how good the agents adapt to the system. I f SD is small, the attendance in the 
minor i ty group is maximized and more agents win, thus leading to an effective 
system. 
We also studied the dependence of SD on m for different values of N. 
Figure 2.5 shows the SD on m for different values of N. The min imum of SD 
is shifted to larger m as N increases and the min imum attains a smaller value 
for small value of N. However, the features of SD on m are more or less the 
same for different values of N. For large m, the SD converges to the coin-toss 
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Figure 2.4: The attendance distribution in a particular group for m = 14. Other 
parameters are N = 101, 5 = 2. 
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Figure 2.5: SD as a function of m for iV = 101,301,501 wi th 5 = 2. 
l im i t of \ / ]V /2 . The influence of different values of s on the SD is shown in 
Fig. 2.6. The min imum is deeper for smaller values of s (except s = 1). The 
location of the min imum is shifted to large m and the value of the SD at the 
min imum increases as s increases. Savit et al. [7] studied the behavior of the 
SD in detail and found that the location of the min imum satisfies the equality 
2 • 〜N • s. The dependence on N and s shown in Figs. 2.5 and 2.6 is 
consistent w i th the results of Savit et al. 
2.3 Crowd-Anticrowd Theory 
To explain the features in the MG, Johnson et al. [41] quanti tat ively analyzed 
the correlations and the number of agents using different strategies. I t was 
found that the SD is related to the collective actions of a crowd of agents 
using similar strategies and an anticrowd using strategies opposite to that of 
the crowd. This theory is called the crowd-anticrowd theory. 
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Figure 2.6: SD as a function of m for N = 101 and s = 2,3,4，5. 
For the 爪 different strategies, there exist pairs of strategies that are anti-
correlated to each other. Among the 22爪 strategies there is some redundancy 
because some strategies are highly correlated. Hamming distance dff is a mea-
sure of the difference between two strategies, R and R'. We label the i t h 
component of the strategy R as Ri, then the Hamming distance is defined by: 
2爪 
dH = ^ \ R i - R ' i \ (2.1) 
i=i 
The Hamming distance dn between correlated strategies is less than (Eq. 
(2.1)). We can reduce the ful l strategy space to a reduced strategy space, which 
includes only 2爪 pairs of anticorrelated strategies. Strategies in pair differ by 
the maximum Hamming distance dn = Strategies in different pairs are 
uncorrelated and they differ by dn = I t has been shown that the SD 
in the basic MG is essentially unchanged if the reduced strategy space is used 
instead of the ful l strategy space [5, 42]. We simulated the basic MG using 
reduced strategy space for N = 101 and s = 2 and the results of SD on m are 
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shown in Fig. 2.7. The results of using the ful l strategy space are also included 
for comparison. The results show basically the same features. 
Johnson et al. employed the reduced strategy space to decompose the SD 
into the contributions f rom different anticorrelated and uncorrelated strategies. 
The interplay between agents using an anticorrelated strategy pair is crucial 
in explaining the behavior of the SD as a funct ion of m. I n the M G , the agents 
are not really acting independently. Let ur be the number of agents using the 
same strategy R. A l though there is no informat ion on what is the action of 
the other agents and there is no direct communication among agents, the ur 
agents act in the same way as a “crowd", i.e., they make the same decision. 
Simultaneously, there are n良 agents using the anticorrelated strategy R. This 
group w i l l make the opposite decision and hence behaves as an “ anticrowd". 
Over the t ime scale during which the two opposite strategies are being played, 
the fluctuation of attendance is determined by the difference \nR — in 
each crowd-anticrowd strategy pair (R, R) • In the crowd-anticrowd theory, 
the agents using a pair of strategies are strongly correlated and the agents 
using uncorrelated strategies are assumed to act independently. Thus, the 
variance is given by 
一二 Xl圭丨几丑及丨2， (2-2) 
(R.R) 
where the sum is over all anticorrelated pairs of strategies. Figure 2.8 shows 
the results of the crowd-anticrowd theory. The results are in good agreement 
w i th numerical results. 
Qualitatively, the crowd-anticrowd theory gives a physical explanation of 
the dependence of SD on m as follows. In the small m regime, the reduced 
strategy space is small and hence the probabil i ty for an agent to carry the Rth 
strategy is high. When agents tend to use a strategy R, i.e., i t is a popular 
strategy, the anticorrelated strategy R turns out to be unpopular. Thus, there 
Chapter 2 The Minority Game: .4 Revitu 18 
30 I ‘ " 1 1 j 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 0 - ^ -
A • reduced strategy space 
Q A A 
- A A 
^ t 
10- ! ! I -
^ 豐 ！ 
0 I I I I I I I I I 1 I I I 
0 5 10 30 I ‘ ‘ 1 ' 1 ‘ ' ' ‘ 1 “ 1 
20 - 8 ° full strategy space 
o 
s • i i 
1� - " I -
• Q - 0 0 0 0 0 
i • • • 
0 I 1 I I I 1 1 1 1 I I I I 
0 5 10 
m 
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exists crowd of agents using a strategy in the absence of a corresponding ant i -
crowd using the anticorrelated strategy. Therefore, the crowd dominates and 
this leads to a large SD. When m is large, the corresponding strategy space is 
much larger than the number of strategies being picked. The chance a strategy 
and i ts ant icorrelated partner to be played decreases rap id ly as m increases. 
As a result, the crowds and anticrowds have effectively disappeared and the 
agents behave as i f they are making their decisions randomly. The variance is 
then given by cr^  〜 N / 4 ： . I n the intermediate m regime，the size of the reduced 
strategy space and the number of strategies in play are comparable. The pair 
R and R can bo th be popular. Thus, there is a cancellation effect between the 
crowd and ant icrowd using an anticorrelated pair of strategies. Th is cancella-
t i on effect leads a m i n i m u m in SD for intermediate m. Note tha t the size of 
the ant icrowd depends on s. For smaller s, the size of the ant icrowd is larger. 
The cancellation between the crowd and the ant icrowd is more effective for 
smaller s and the m i n i m u m of the SD is deeper. The crowd-ant icrowd theory 
can also be extended to study the dynamics of the M G [46 . 
2.4 Some variation on the Minority Game 
2.4.1 The Thermal Minority Game (TMG) 
Cavagna et al. [18] introduced and studied "The Thermal M ino r i t y Game 
( T M G ) " , which is a continuous and stochastic extension of the minor i t y game. 
The model used a vector in the real space 况 ” to define a strategy R , w i t h the 
constraint that | |R| | = y/D. Hence, a strategy can be thought of as a point on 
a sphere representing the strategy space P. A random noise 77⑴，defined as a 
uni t vector in 况、 is introduced as the information. Then, the response 6(R) 
of a strategy R to the informat ion 77(t) is given by 
6 ( R )三 R . 77⑴. （2.3) 
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The response is the b id prescribed by the part icular strategy R and the b id 
is continuous, which can be positive (buy) or negative (sell). The to ta l b id is 
given by 
N 
雄 ) = (2.4) 
i = i 
The v i r tua l point of strategy R is represented by a t ime dependent funct ion 
P ( R , t ) , which is updated according to 
P ( R , t + 1 ) - P(R， t) - A{t)b(R). (2.5) 
Final ly, the employment of strategies is defined stochastically. For agent i, the 
probabi l i ty of using her strategy a = 1, • • • , s is given by 
mt) 二 (2.6) 
where 
6=1 
The inverse temperature == 1 / T is a measure of the analyzing power of the 
agents. When T = 0, T M G reduces to basic MG. When T - f oo, an agent 
picks a strategy randomly for her action. Cavagna et al. found an interesting 
feature in between the two l imits. The SD, cr(T), is not a monotonical ly 
decreasing funct ion of T . Instead, there is a large intermediate temperature 
range in which a is smaller than the random coin-toss l im i t . Therefore, a way 
to suppress the SD below the random coin-toss l im i t is not to always use the 
best strategy, but to allow for a certain degree of randomness. 
2.4.2 The Evolutionary Minority Game (EMG) 
Johnson et al. [25，26, 47] recognized that the basic M G does not incorporate 
evolution and agents are stuck w i th their in i t ia l pick of strategies. To allow for 
evolving strategies, they proposed the Evolut ionary Minor i ty Game (EMG) . 
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In the E M G , each agent tries to learn f rom its past mistakes and w i l l 
adjust her strategy in order to survive. In i t ia l ly, each agent is assigned a 
value p {0 < p < 1) and there is only one strategy for the whole populat ion. 
The ith agent w i l l have probabi l i ty pi to follow the predict ion of the strategy 
and probabi l i ty (1 — pi) to choose the opposite action, i.e.，she w i l l reject the 
predict ion of the strategy. Each agent in the minor i ty (major i ty) group, gains 
(losses) one real point in her wealth. Evolut ion is introduced as follows. I f a 
agent's wealth falls below a value d < 0, then her p value is modified. The 
new value of p is randomly chosen w i th in a range R centered on the old value 
of p, and the wealth of the mutated agent is set to zero again. Note that 
for simplicity, reflective boundary conditions are used to ensure 0 < p < 1. 
Simulation results revealed that when the system reaches the steady state, the 
probabi l i ty d istr ibut ion P{p) of p is symmetric about p = 1/2, w i t h peaks 
near p = 0 and p = 1. The results are insensitive to the in i t ia l d istr ibut ion 
of p values. Thus, the agents who always follow or always act opposite to 
the prediction of strategy out-perform the cautious agents. Also, the SD is 
independent of m. Lo et al. [26] proposed a probabil istic theory of the E M G 
and results are in good agreement w i th numerical results. 
In the following Chpaters, we wi l l explain some variations of the basic M G 
using crowd-anticrowd theroy [41] and study some variations of MG. 
Chapter 3 
The Minority Game with 
different payoff functions 
There are intr insical ly many competit ions in a system consisting of a large 
number of agents. Quite generally, the agents par t ic ipat ing in these competi-
tions have to make some decisions, e.g., to buy or to sell in a financial market， 
or to decide to j o in which organization as a member in a society. Even in 
biological systems, animals have to choose a place to live. Most of the par-
t icipants in a compet i t ion make their decisions w i t h the a im of gett ing some 
rewards. For a compet i t ion for l imi ted resources, there are very often more 
losers than winners. Therefore, agents compete to be in the minor i ty group. 
The rewards are usually described by a complex payoff funct ion, instead of 
simply a constant. For situations in which the members of the minor i ty group 
share an amount of resource provided by the losing major i t y members, the 
payoff varies in t ime. The situat ion that the payoff increases as the size of the 
minor i ty group decreases are of part icular ly interest. 
In Sec. 3.1, we review the work of Savit et al. [48] on the minor i ty game 
w i th payoff functions of the form A{r)〜r—" and A{r)〜e—?”，where r is the 
rat io of the size of the minor i ty group to the to ta l population. We then apply 
the crowd-anticrowd theory [42] to explain some basic features of the models 
in Sec. 3.2. 
23 
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3.1 Review 
3.1.1 Models of Savit et al. [48； 
I n the basic M ino r i t y Game (MG) [4]，there are N heterogeneous agents, where 
N is an odd number, p laying the game. They are in a compet i t ion tha t they 
have to choose between two groups, say group 0 and group 1, at every instant 
of t ime. A l l agents in the minor i ty group are the winners and they gain some 
rewards at that t ime step. The agents belonging to the ma jo r i t y group are 
the losers and they get nothing. For instance in a financial market, the sellers 
w i l l make more prof i t when there in an excess of buyers. The M G is thus 
a simple, yet non-t r iv ia l , model for situations in which i t is beneficial to be 
in the minor i ty . The only in format ion available to the agents is the history, 
which is a l ist of the minor i ty groups in the most recent m t ime steps, e.g. 
• • • 01100101. Agents make their decisions according to the predict ion of their 
strategies based on the history. In fact, they may have several strategies. A 
strategy is a look-up table which returns a predict ion on which group w i l l be 
the minor i ty group, w i t h the informat ion of the history. I n the beginning, each 
agent picks once and for al l s strategies randomly f rom a strategy pool, w i t h 
repetit ions allowed. The performance of each strategy w i l l be recorded. Af ter 
each turn, each strategy that would have predicted the correct minor i ty group 
is given a v i r tua l point, no matter i t is actually used or not in tha t t ime. The 
v i r tua l point is assigned according to some payoff funct ion depending on the 
size of the minor i ty group. The payoff functions A{r) used in Ref. [48] include 
a power law and an exponential function, w i t h r being the rat io of the size of 
the minor i ty group to the to ta l number of agents, i .e.，r = n/N. Specifically, 
Savit et al. used payoff functions of the form of A{r)〜r—" and A{r)〜e—"『， 
where a and 7 are constants. The l im i t ing cases of a 0 or 7 ^ 0 reduce 
to the basic MG. In each turn, each agent uses the strategy w i th the highest 
v i r tua l point at the instant of t ime from her s strategies. Note that the same 
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payoff functions A{r) w i l l be used as the gains in the wealth of agents. 
3.1.2 Results 
Savit et al. [48] studied the models numerical ly for 10000 t ime steps and for 
N = 51, 101, and 201 agents. The payoff functions were set to be A{r) 二 e一^、 
A{r) = r—2，A{r) = r—i，A{r) = — and A{r) — eO i : The general relat ionship 
between the standard deviat ion (SD) of the attendance in one group and the 
memory size m for different payoff functions were shown to give basically the 
.same features as in the basic MG. 
We reproduce the results in Fig. 3.1，with the results of the basic M G 
{A{r) 二 1) included for comparison. I t is shown tha t the general behavior 
of SD as a funct ion of m does not depend sensitively on A{r). Savit et al. 
proposed that the mean wealth of the agents should be of the order of the 
payoff funct ion t imes the typical number of agents in the minor i ty group. 
Based on this idea, they worked out an analyt ical expression for the mean 
wealth as a funct ion of m which is in a good agreement w i t h s imulat ion results. 
The robustness of the relat ion between SD and m for different payoff functions 
A{r) was explained w i th in the context of statist ical mechanics, w i t h A{r) being 
an irrelevant operator [49]. The results suggested that most of the features 
in the minor i ty game are unaffected i f A{r) is changed. Savit et al also 
investigated other properties of the system, e.g., the average wealth and the 
wealth distr ibut ion. These quantities show a dependence on A{r). The results 
showed that although the detailed dynamics for different A(r) are somewhat 
different, the dynamics of the game remind unchanged, thus leading to the 
same relation between SD and m. 
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Figure 3.1: SD as a function of m for MG with different payoff functions. The five 
different functions used are: A{r) = A{r) = t—\ A{r) = r—丄，A{r) = r^ and 
A{r) = eO.i: Other parameters are N = 101 and s = 2. The results of basic MG 
(A(r) = 1) are also included for comparison. Note that the full strategy space is 
used in the simulation. 
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3.2 Applying Crowd-anticrowd theory to the 
models 
Savit et al. [48] carried out the simulations using the fu l l strategy space. 
We reproduce the results of Savit et al. using the reduced strategy space, 
where there are a to ta l of 2爪 s t r a t e g i e s consisting only of anti-correlated 
pairs and uncorrelated strategies [4]. Figure 3.2 gives the SD as a funct ion 
of m for different payoff functions using the reduced strategy space, where N 
is taken to be 101 and 5 = 2. The results obtained in the reduced strategy 
space are in good agreement w i t h those obtained by Savit et al [48] and 
reproduced in Fig. 3.1 using the fu l l strategy space. Figure 3.2 shows that 
similar features are found for payoff functions A{r)〜广“and A{r)〜e— 
and these features are the same as those in the basic M G , i.e., the funct ion of 
the standard deviat ion against m is unaltered i f the payoff funct ion is altered. 
Here, we demonstrate that the robustness of SD against m can be explained 
using the crowd-anticrowd theory proposed by Johnson et al. [42]. From Fig. 
3.2，we observe that the m in imum of the standard deviat ion occurs at m = 6 
wi th al l the different payoff functions for our choice of parameters. This can 
be understood in terms of the crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect near the 
m in imum point, as in the basic MG. Here, we apply the theory of Ref. [42] to 
show how this cancellation effect st i l l works. 
Here we give a description of our simulat ion and how to apply the crowd-
anticrowd theory to the present models. First , we carry out the simulations 
in reduced strategy space. This choice simplifies the calculations and gives 
a clear explanation of the robustness of the features. Then we compute the 
standard deviation analyt ical ly using the fol lowing equation [42] : 
Chapter 3 The Minority Game with different payoff functions 28 
7 ； T 
『 、 S 4 - ^ n f ， （3.1) 
\ \iR,R) / 
where {R, R) is an anti-correlated pair of strategies, ur is the number of agents 
using the strategy R in making the choice and n良 is the number of agents using 
the anticorrelated strategy R in making the choice. We then find ur and n ^ 
in a t ime window and compute the values of ur — n^ for each m and for all 
the pairs. The theoretical results using Eq. (3.1) are also shown in Fig. 3.2 
together w i th simulation results. The theoretical results are in good agreement 
w i th simulation results. 
The success of Eq. (3.1) relies on the crowd-anticrowd effects. More pre-
cisely, we rank the strategies used on the previous t ime step in a populari ty 
list {rik}, where k — 1 refers to the most popular one and so on. W i t h the pop-
ulari ty list, we know which strategy is the most popular at an instant of t ime. 
We then calculate the probabil i ty P{k' = k), the probabil i ty that k appears in 
the rank k' of the popularity list, where k is the anti-correlated partner of the 
strategy k. We do this for both the exponential and power law payoff functions 
w i th A; = 1. The results are shown in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4. We observe that for 
small m {m — 2), very few agents use the anticorrelated partner of the most 
popular strategy, and most agents are using uncorrelated strategies. There is 
a crowd using the most popular strategies wi th no (or a small size) anticrowd 
using the anticorrelated partners of the popular strategies. This leads to the 
formation of a crowd of similar decisions which, in turn, leads to a large SD. 
For intermediate values of m (m = 5), P{k') has a peak at small k' indicating 
that the anticorrelated partner of the most popular strategy is also popular. 
Thus, i t is likely that the two most popular strategies are anticorrelated pair. 
In this case, a large portion of the population are using this pair of strate-
gies and their contributions to the SD cancel. Thus, there is a crowd and an 
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Figure 3.2: SD as a function of m with different payoff functions obtained by 
numerical simulations using the reduced strategy space. The different functions 
used are: A(r) = 6—4”，A(r) = r ' ^ , A(r) = r—i and A(r) = The other 
parameters are N = 101 and s = 2. Theoretical results (solid lines) are obtained by 
Eq. (3.1). 
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anticrowd of similar sizes. The cancellation effect leads to a m in imum in the 
SD. As m increases, we found that the standard deviation approaches the ran-
dom coin-toss l im i t and 二 k) becomes nearly flat. The distr ibut ions for 
m 二 10 are shown in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4. Clearly, agents tend to use strategies 
other than the anti-correlated partner of the most popular one as there are 
many more strategies than the tota l number of agents N ( i . e.，2爪+ i》N) . 
Thus, there is no cancellation effect. Since the agents pick the strategies at 
random, they make their decisions as of they are flipping a coin in the large 
m l im i t . Therefore, the features are the same as the basic MG. 
In summary, we have simulated the M G using a payoff funct ion which 
depends on the size of the minor i ty group, and have compared the results 
obtained by the analytical expression Ref. [42] w i th numerical results. We 
found that there is a robust relationship between the standard deviation and m. 
We have applied the crowd-anticrowd theory [42] to explain the dependence of 
the standard deviation on m. The crowd-anticrowd cancellation effect implies 
the occurrence of a min imum standard deviation at intermediate value of m. 
According to the crowd-anticrowd theory [42], the important feature is the 
behavior of the probabil i ty function 二旬 for A; 二 1 in the popular i ty 
ordered list. As the same features as in the basic M G are observed, the different 
ways of assigning v i r tua l points actually give the same behavior in P(k' : k), 
and hence the same relationship between the standard deviation and m. Note 
that the actual ranking of which strategy is most popular, second most popular, 
etc. may actually be different for different payoff functions. 
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Figure 3.3: The probability P{k' = k) wi th k = 1 against k' for A{r) = e'^''. We 
have used 7 = 4 and 7 = 一0.1 and different values of m, m = 2, m = 5 and m = 10. 
Other parameters are N — 101 and s = 2. 
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Chapter 4 
The Minority Game with 
k-sided imitation in regular 
networks 
In a competit ive situation, e.g. in financial markets, a number of agents inter-
act (or trade) among each other. These trading processes involve a strategy of 
interaction w i th the environment as perceived by agents. The environment is 
basically determined by the agents' action and the competitions among them. 
On the other hand, there are sti l l relationships of different extents among the 
agents. For instance, there may be a leader among a group of agents. The 
leader may be someone who is much wealthy or powerful. She leads a team 
and affects the actions of the other agents. Also, there may be someone who 
wants to spread their valued thought in a population or to learn and copy other 
agents' strategy. Thus there may be some sort of contagious processes, which 
occur as individuals come into contact wi th one another and interact. These 
interactions result in a form of imitat ive behavior throughout the population. 
For example, an imitator may follow the action or strategy of the "leader". 
Here we introduce imitat ive behavior among the agents in tlie basic minor i ty 
game (MG). 
I l l Sec. 4.1, we review the work of Slanina [35’ 36] on the effects of imitat ions 
33 
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in the MG. We study an extension of Slanina's model in Sec. 4.2. We propose 
and study a new model on M G w i th imi ta t ion in Sec. 4.3. A summary w i l l be 
given in Sec. 4.4. 
4.1 Review 
4.1.1 1-sided follow-action model 
In the basic MG, the agents w i l l not interact directly w i th each other. Instead, 
they interact indirect ly through the creation of the history bit-str ing, which in 
tu rn affects the agents' decisions. Since the output involves the action of all 
agents, the interaction is long range. In real markets, there are some short-
range interactions among the agents in addit ion to the long-range interaction. 
These short-range interactions could be in the form of imitat ions among agents. 
Slanina proposed a model of M G w i th imi ta t ion [35, 36]. The model is 
given as follows. Suppose that there are N agents, where N is an odd number. 
Each agent has to choose between 2 groups, 0 or 1, in each t ime step, wi thout 
knowing what the other agents wi l l do. A reward is given to each of the 
agents in the minor i ty group. The agents make decisions based on the global 
information of the past record. The past records only tel l which group is 
the winning group, wi thout announcing the actual attendance. We call this 
t ime series the history, which is represented by a binary sequence of the form 
• •. 1000101 … • Since agents wi l l only have l imi ted analyzing power, they can 
only retain a certain length of the history, but not all. We assume that all 
the agents have the same memory size of m, i.e., they can only retain the 
most recent m bits of the history series and make their next decision based 
only on these m bits. Each agent has s strategies and each strategy is a look-
up table containing the prediction of next action for each of the possible 
sequences of a m-b i t history string. Examples of some strategies are given in 
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history strategy 1 strategy 2 | . •. strategy 
000 0 0 ~ i 
001 0 0 … 1 
010 0 0 . . . 1 
O i l 0 0 1 
100 0 0 … 1 
101 0 0 1 
110 0 0 . . . 1 
111 0 1 I . . . I 1 
Table 4.1: The strategies of m = 3 case. 
Table 4.1 for m = 3. There are a tota l of strategies in the pool and each 
agent randomly draws s strategies from the pool in the beginning of the game, 
w i t h repetit ions allowed. Besides, the merit of a strategy is represented by the 
v i r tua l point of a strategy. One v i r tua l point is added to a strategy i f i t gives 
a correct prediction to the outcome. The agent uses the strategy w i th the 
highest accumulated v i r tua l point for her action. She wi l l get a (real) point 
for her wealth i f she is in the minor i ty group and hence a winner. The agents 
in the major i ty group get nothing. 
Slanina introduced imi ta t ion in the population in the fol lowing way [35, 
36]. Imagine that there is a linear chain w i th one-directional nearest-neighbor 
connections among the agents. Each agent can interact wi th, say, her neighbor 
on the left-hand side only. She is allowed to know the wealth of her neighbor. 
Note that not all the agents can imitate their neighbor. In order to do so, two 
conditions must be met. Firstly, an agent must be a potential imi tator who 
can choose whether to imitate or not. We label potential imitators by a label 
1 = 1. For agents who do not imitate throughout the game are labelled I = 0. 
A t the beginning we assign each agent the label I = 1 w i th probabil i ty p and 
label I = 0 w i th probabil i ty (1 - p). Thus p is the fraction of the potential 
imitators in the population. Slanina allowed swapping between the two types 
of behavior at a constant rate. The labels can change at each t ime step w i th 
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probabil i t ies pi (1 0) and p2 (0 -)> 1) w i t h the condit ion p = ^ ^ so that 
the average density of potent ial imitators does not change in t ime. Secondly, 
a potent ial im i ta tor w i l l imi tate her neighbor only i f the accumulated wealth 
of her neighbor is larger than her wealth. We suppose that the agent does 
not know the strategy of her neighbor. I f she decides to imi tate her neighbor, 
she has to pay a commission e to her neighbor and then follows her neighbor's 
action in the next t ime step. 
4.1.2 Results 
Slanina studied the model numerically for a populat ion of N 二 1001, m = 6 
and 5 = 2, and p, pi and p2 are allowed to vary. We reproduce the t ime 
dependence of the fraction of imitators N j j N for several values of pi in Fig. 4.1. 
Here N i is the number of agents who actually imi tated the neighbor's action. 
The results are in qualitative agreement w i th those of Slanina [35, 36]. I t is 
found that N j j N depends on pi. When pi = 0, N j j N increases monotonically 
unt i l saturation. For p i / 0, N i / N in i t ia l ly grows and approaches a maximum 
before decreasing to a saturated value that is weakly dependent on p i . Slanina 
also showed the distr ibut ion of the agents' wealth for different values of p i . I t 
is found that some clusters of agents are formed and they persisted forever. 
These groups are called the poor groups [35]. For p i • 0, i t is found that the 
large poor groups are unstable and they split into smaller clusters. Slanina 
also investigated the wealth as a function of t ime and the small social tensions 
(io.5 given by 
二 广〜l|”2, 
where the average wealth < W > = ；^ w i th W j being the wealth of the 
jth agent. Slanina also studied the attendance fluctuations (二< {A — >, 
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Figure 4.1: The time evolution of the fraction of actual imitators N i / N with the 
fraction of potential imitators p = 0.95 and different values of Other parameters 
are N = 1001, m = 6, 5 = 2 and e = 0.05. 
where A is the attendance of a particular group, say 0) as a function of p for 
different values of m. I t is found that moderate imi tat ion can be beneficial, 
while too much imitat ion is harmful. 
4.2 Follow-action model 
4.2.1 2-sided model 
In more realistic situations, the agents do not only know one friend or interact 
w i th one agent only. They may have more information about the other agents' 
wealth. Here, we extend the model of Slanina. Consider a system consisting 
of N agents participating in a MG. Imitat ion in our model is introduced as 
follows. Suppose that, geometrically, the agents are arranged in a circle w i th 
N nodes. Each node has k connections to k neighboring nodes. A schematic 
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o 
Figure 4.2: Schematic diagram of a circle of agents wi th k = 2 neighbors. 
diagram for A; 二 2 is shown in Fig. 4.2. Then, each agent has k neighbors and 
she knows the wealth of al l her k neighbors. She may choose to imi ta te or not, 
i f she is a potent ial imi ta tor {I = 1). A n imi ta tor w i l l follow the action of the 
"leader" and give the "leader" a commission e. A t the beginning of the game, 
we assign the label / = 1 to each agent w i t h probabi l i ty p. Unlike in Slanina's 
model, the label is not allowed to change throughout the game. For k = 1, 
the present model reduces to Slanina's model [35，36] w i t h pi = 0. For k = 0, 
the present model reduces to the basic MG. Here, we first consider the case of 
k = 2, i.e., the agent can interact w i th her two nearest neighbors on the left 
hand and r ight hand sides. 
4.2.2 Results 
We consider a system w i th N = 1001 agents, s = 2 and e = 0.05. Since the 
behavior of each agent cannot be changed, our model is an “ alloy" problem 
Chapter 4 The Minority Game with k-sided imitation in regular networks 39 
0 . 8 I ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ i I ‘~~‘ 111111 — I — I ” I 111111 1—I 11 1 — I I 11 [ 11 
0 . 6 - -/ y 
/ / k = 1 
/ ——k = 2 
！ 0 . 4 - / -/ 
7 : 
- 0 , … • 
1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 
time step 
Figure 4.3: The time evolution of the fraction of imitators Ni/N w i th p = 0.80 for 
k = 1 and k = 2. Other parameters are N — 1001，m 二 7，s = 2 and e — 0.05. 
for a mixed populat ion w i t h a fract ion of imitators. Note that not al l the 
potent ial imi tators w i l l actual imi ta te their neighbor's action, as a potent ia l 
im i ta tor may be the richest among the group. We show the t ime evolut ion of 
the fract ion of actual imi tators Ni/N for p = 0.8 and m = 7 in Fig. 4.3. The 
results of /c = 1 are also included for comparison. Figure 4.3 shows that the 
number of imi tators increases monotonical ly un t i l saturat ion for both k = 1 
and k = 2 cases. From the definit ion of the model, when one agent becomes 
an imi ta tor at a t ime, then she w i l l be an imi ta tor forever. I t is because 
the imi ta tor has to pay a commission to the "leader" and the actions of the 
imi ta tor and the "leader" are the same. The imi tator 's wealth, therefore, must 
be lower than that of the "leader". Therefore, the number of imi tators w i l l 
increase once the game starts. As t ime evolves, some potent ial imi tators may 
be the richest among their neighbors, and they w i l l stop im i ta t ing throughout 
the game. Af ter a while there is no further change in number of imi tators and 
the imi ta t ion structure in the populat ion becomes frozen. 
The main feature of the basic M G is that the attendance fluctuation on m. 
Chapter 4 The Minority Game with k-sided imitation in regular networks 40 
Since the mean of attendance is N/2, the standard deviat ion of the attendance 
in a part icular group is the same as the attendance fluctuation. I t is found tha t 
there is a m i n i m u m in the fluctuation as a funct ion of m. For the basic M G 
w i t h N — 1001 and s = 2, the m in imum appears at m — 9 or 10. We found 
tha t when the im i ta t i on is introduced the m in imum is shifted to m = 7 for 
our model w i t h k = 1 and k — 2 using the same set of parameters. Figure 4.4 
shows the attendance fluctuation ( < { A - ^ Y >，where A is the attendance of 
a part icular group, say, 0) against m for A; — 1 and k = 2. The results basically 
give the same features as that of the basic MG. The only difference is that the 
m in imum point is shifted to a smaller value of m. A l lowing im i ta t i on among 
agents leads to the clustering of agents into a group using the same strategy. 
Thus, the behavior of our model becomes effectively that of a basic M G w i t h 
fewer agents. More explicit ly, we show the average success rate of the agents 
against m for p 二 0.8 in Fig. 4.5. The results of the basic M G are included for 
comparison. I n the small m cases, i.e., m < 7, the success rate of the present 
model {k 二 2) is higher than that of the basic MG. Thus, im i ta t ion enhances 
the success rate for small m. However, for m > 7, i t is found that the success 
rate is lowered when agent are allowed to imitate. The max imum success rate 
is found to be at m = 7 for p 二 0.8. Next, we study the effect of different 
values of p on the success rate. Figure 4.6 shows the success rate as a funct ion 
of p for m = 7. I t is found that there exists a part icular value of p for A; = 2 
such that the success rate is a maximum. For k = 2 and m = 7, im i ta t ion is 
found to always enhance the average success rate of the agents regardless of 
the value of p, and the spread of the results in each run is not very wide. 
4.2.3 k-sided model and results 
Here, we consider the generalized case of a k-sided imi ta t ion model, where k 
is any integer smaller than N _ 1. From Fig. 4.3, we found that the number 
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Chapter 4 The Minority Game with k-sided imitation in regular networks 42 
0.5 . 1 . 1 . , . 1 — I 
° k = 2 
mean value 
尝 。 。 _ 
o 
o 
0.47 • ‘ ‘ 1 ‘ 1 ‘ ‘ ‘ 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
P 
Figure 4.6: The success rate against p with m = 7 for A; = 2. Other parameters are 
N = 1001, 5 = 2 and e = 0.05. The results of 32 independent runs are shown. The 
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of imitators w i l l saturate for A; : 1 and k = 2. Figure 4.7 shows the saturated 
fraction of imitators as a function of p for different values of k. The fraction 
of imitators slightly increases as k increases. When p is small, most of the 
potential imitators interact w i th other agents and decide to imitate. Thus the 
fraction of imitators is approximately given by p, i.e., Ni/N ~ p. 
The average success rate as a function of p is shown in Fig. 4.8 for different 
values of k ranging from A; = 0 (the basic MG) to k = 100. We use even values 
of k so that k/2 nearest neighbors on both sides are included. Figure 4.8 shows 
that for a given k, there is a value of p, called pc, such that the corresponding 
success rate is a maximum. Clearly, pc depends on k. When k is large, the 
value of Pc is small. For instance, when k = 100, Pc ~ 0.15. For p > pc, the 
success rate decreases. For larger values of k, the slope for the decrease in 
the success rate is steeper. For large k, say k > S, and a population w i th a 
significant port ion of potential imitators, i.e., p is large, there exist some large 
clusters of agents. Agents in a cluster follow the same action of the "leader", 
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Figure 4.7: The saturated fraction of imitators Ni/N as a function of p for some 
values of k. The parameters arc N 二 1001, 77i = 7, s = 2 and e = 0.05. 
who is the richest agent in the cluster. As the duster becomes larger, there is 
a crowd choosing the same group. This collective action of a crowd lowers tlie 
winning probabil i ty of the agents in the crowd. Thorc^fore, the average success 
rate of the agents decreases a.s j) and k increase for large k and p. Hence, 
moderate imi tat ion can be beneficial, whi lr too much imi tat ion is harmful. 
4.3 Follow-strategy model 
4.3.1 1-sided and 2-sided models 
The l)oliavior of tlie imitators nerds not he that of following t lie action of 
the “leader". She may. for oxainph?. instcarl want to know and follow the 
strategy of the ” leader". In tliis sect ion. wr a)n‘si(iei. anui ln'r possible i i i i i tat ion 
behavior. The model is ddined as follows. A total of .V agonts roinpotp in 
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the M G . They have to choose between two groups and a reward w i l l be given 
to those who are in the minor i t y group. Each of them has s strategies based 
on which she decides according to the history of the most recent m w inn ing 
groups. Geometrical ly, the agents are arranged in a circle w i t h N nodes. Each 
node has k connections to k neighboring nodes. There are two types of agents 
w i t h different im i ta ted behavior labelled by / = 0 and Z = 1. The agents w i t h 
label I — 0 w i l l not imi ta te other agents' strategy throughout the game. The 
agents w i t h label Z == 1 are potent ia l imi tators who are allowed to know her 
neighbors' wealth. A t the beginning of the game, each agent has a probabi l i ty 
p to become a potent ia l im i ta to r (labelled I = 1). I f the potent ia l im i ta to r finds 
tha t her neighbors are richer than her, then she chooses to imi ta te the richest 
one. In doing so，she needs to pay a commission e to her richest neighbor and 
then she is allowed to know her neighbor's best performing strategy, i.e., the 
strategy w i t h the highest v i r tua l points and in part icular the predict ion for the 
corresponding history b i t -s t r ing at that moment. The im i ta to r w i l l then follow 
the predict ion of her richest neighbor's best-performing strategy, regardless of 
what the actual action of her richest neighbor may be. The im i ta to r and the 
"leader" may thus have different actions at a t ime because the imi ta tor simply 
follows the strategy but not the actual action of the " leader". The "leader" 
may, in turn, follow other neighbor's strategy. Here, we consider the cases of 
k = 1 and k = 2. For k = 1, each agent only knows the wealth of her nearest 
neighbor on her left hand side. For k = 2, each agent knows the wealth of her 
two nearest neighbors on the left and right hand sides. 
4.3.2 Results 
We studied the model numerically for a system wi th N = 1001, 5 = 2 and 
£ = 0.05. Figure 4.9 shows the fraction of imitators N i / N as a function of 
t ime. The results oi k = 1 and k = 2 give the same qualitat ive features. The 
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Figure 4.9: The time evolution of the fraction of imitators for A; = 1 and k = 2 with 
p = 0.8. The parameters are N = 1001, m = 7, s = 2 and e = 0.05. 
number of imitators increases monotonically unt i l saturation. The fraction of 
imitators for A; = 2 is higher than that for k = 1 because the agents in the case 
of A; = 2 have more chance to interact w i th a richer neighbor. The interaction 
network is thus wider in the model of A; = 2. 
Figure 4.10 shows the attendance fluctuation (< {A — y ) ^ > , where A is 
the attendance of a particular group, say, 0) against m for both k = 1 and 
k = 2. I t is found that the two models give basically the same features as that 
of the basic MG. The only difference is that the minimum of the fluctuation is 
shifted towards a smaller value of m. For k = 1, the minimum occurs at m 二 8. 
For k — 2, the minimum occurs somewhere near m = 7 and m = 8. Since the 
potential imitators have the abil i ty to "use" her richest neighbor's strategies, 
they have effectively more than s strategies. They may have at most s + k 
strategies, w i th conditions imposed for the use of the extra k strategies. To 
study the effect of imitat ion in the present model more explicitly, we show the 
success rate as a function of m for A; = 1 and k = 2 in Fig. 4.11. The results of 
the basic MG are included for comparison. Figure 4.11 shows that the three 
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Figure 4.10: The attendance fluctuation against m for = 1 and k = 2 with 
p = 0.8. Other parameters are N = 1001, s = 2 and e = 0.05. 
models basically give the same features. The imi tat ion effect always gives an 
enchancement of the success rate when m < 8 for both Ic = 1 and k = 2 
models, when compared w i th the basic MG using the same set of parameters. 
The success rates of 32 independent runs as a function of p are shown in Fig. 
4.12 for m = 7, A; = 1 and k — 2. The success rate reaches a maximum at 
p = 1, i.e., when all the agents have the abil i ty to imitate, in both models. I t 
shows that for m 二 7, imi tat ion enhances the success rate for all values of p, 
when k = 1 and k = 2. 
4.3.3 k-sided model and results 
We consider the generalized k-sided model, where k is any integer smaller than 
N — 1. The saturated fraction of imitators as a function of p is shown in Fig. 
4.13 for different values of k ranging from 0 to 100. As p < 0.2，most of 
the potential imitators wi l l become actual imitators for all values of k. As p 
increases from 0.2 to 1, the curves corresponding to different values of k spread 
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out. The fraction of imitators becomes independent of A; for A: > 20. This is 
because in a cluster of many agents, the strategy of the richest agent w i l l be 
followed and all the potential imitators wi l l choose to imitate, thus, N i / N 〜 p 
for k > 20. I t is interesting to see i f i t is really good to have so many imitators 
in the model. The success rate as a function of p is shown in Fig. 4.14 for 
m = 7. From Fig. 4.14，it is not always good for the whole population to 
have the abi l i ty of imitat ion, especially for k > 10. For k = 2, the success rate 
is a maximum at p = 1. For cases w i th k > 2, there is a crit ical p, p。such 
that the average success rate of the agents is a maximum. Figure 4.14 shows 
that Pc decreases as k increases. When both k and p are large, there exist 
only a few "leaders" in the population and a large crowd of agents wi l l then 
follow the same strategy and behave similarly. Thus, the winning probabil i ty 
of the agents wi l l be lower than the case without imitat ion. As the connections 
among agents become wider, moderate imi tat ion wi l l benefit the population, 
but too much imi tat ion is harmful. 
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Figure 4.14: The success rate as a function of p for different values of k. The 
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4.4 Summary 
I n summary, we have studied modif ied models of M G w i t h im i ta t ion among 
the agents. The imi tators are allowed to follow the action or the best strategy 
of the "leaders" in her connected group of agents. We have studied the cases 
of one neighbor and two neighbors in detail. We have found tha t the average 
success rate of the agents is enhanced for small values of m ( m < 7) for bo th 
the fol low-action and follow-strategy models. We have also generalized the 
models to k-sided models, in which an agent is connected to k neighbors. We 
have performed computer simulations for all models and we have found that 
moderate im i ta t ion can be beneficial, while too much im i ta t ion is harmful . 
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There may be other ways in which imi tat ion among the agents can be 
introduced. For instance, the imitators may simply follow the last-action of 
the "leader" wi thout paying a commission. I t is a follow-the-winner strategy 
and is not uncommon for trades in markets. In realistic situations, there 
are usually a mixed population w i th agents of different imi ta t ion behavior 
and ability. These modifications of the basic M G wi th imi ta t ion are worth 
exploring in the future. 
！ 
Chapter 5 
One-lane traffic flow models 
Needless to say, we encounter traffic jams almost everyday. Many cities around 
the world suffer f rom heavy traffic congestion, often associated w i th great 
economical loss. A n efficient t ransportat ion system is thus essential for the 
modern world. Bui ld ing up such a transportat ion system is a long term project 
and requires a large amount of money, man power and technical support. Very 
often, when one problem is solved, another problem appears. For instance, 
when most parts of a highway are in a free flow state, i t may happen that 
some regions of a cross-road is heavily congested. As a result much research 
work have been carried out on studying traffic flow problems. 
Research on traffic flow problems are an inter-disciplinary subject. Re-
searchers in the area of f luid mechanics, applied mathematics, system engi-
neering, traffic engineering, etc. have studied the problem mainly through 
analysis of traffic flow and proposed of some theories. The aim of these work, 
is to explore the underlying principles of vehicular traffic flow w i th the hope 
of making reasonable predictions. Since 1930's, traffic engineers have carried 
out studies on vehicular traffic flow. Grccnshields [50] did an early systematic 
investigation of the traffic flow system at the urban street intersections. In 
1950's, L ighth i l l and Whi tham [51] proposed a theory of the traffic flow system 
based on the fluid dynamical formalism. Meanwhile, Richards [52] proposed a 
similar theory independently, thus, such theory is called LWR. Based on the 
53 
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continuous properties of the fluid, these studies introduced the idea of the fun-
damental diagram of vehicular traffic which shows the relation between traffic 
flux and vehicle density in the steady state. After that , traffic flow systems 
have attracted the attention of scientists. Among them, the physicists have 
been interested in exploring the fundamental principles using the approaches 
statistical physics [3，8，53，54，55]. Recently, there are many models that are 
proposed and studied by physicists. The two main conceptual frameworks are 
the f luid-dynamical description and microscopic models. From both frame-
works, results of model studies are compared w i th empirical results observed 
on the road. I t is hoped that, a model and/or a theory can be proposed for 
understanding the main features in the traffic flow systems. 
In Sec. 5.1，we give a brief introduction on some microscopic models of 
traffic flow and some general features of typical real traffic. We then review 
some features of two models, namely the Nagel-Schreckenberg (NS) [10] and 
Fukui-Ishibashi (FI) [11] models, in Sec. 5.2 and Sec. 5.3, respectively. 
5.1 Introduction 
Since 1950s, researchers have tr ied to develop microscopic models of traffic flow 
by incorporating the most essential ingredients wi th the aim to describe the 
general features of real traffic. Such models can be theoretical analyzed and/or 
studied by computer simulations so as to provide a better understanding of 
the complex phenomena exhibited in real traffic. In microscopic models of 
vehicular traffic, individual vehicle is represented by a "part icle" and the traffic 
flow system is treated as a self-driven many-particle system [56, 57]. W i th in 
the microscopic approach, there are different formulations for the dynamical 
evolution of the system. For example, kinetic theory of gases can be applied to 
describe vehicular traffic wi th in a probabilistic formalism. On the other hand, a 
deterministic formalism is used in the microscopic car-following models [58], in 
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which the basic principles of classical Newtonian dynamics are used to describe 
the mot ion of a vehicle. When considering many-particle systems, the particle 
hopping models [59, 60, 61] are used to describe the stochastic dynamics of 
individual vehicle. These models are mostly based on the method of cellular 
automata (CA) [9], as CA models can be efficiently implemented numerically 
and they exhibit complex dynamical behavior. 
In CA models, the vehicular traffic is treated as a self-organized system. A l l 
the space, t ime and state variables are treated as discrete variables. Besides, 
each lane is subdivided into cells. Each cell is usually taken to be of length 
7.5m, which includes the length of the car plus the min imum spacing between 
vehicles. Each cell is either empty or occupied by at most one vehicle at a 
given instant of time. The movement of the vehicles is governed by a set of 
updating rules. These updating rules may depend on the previous motion of 
other vehicles. Since CA models can be implemented efficiently on computers, 
system consisting of a large number of vehicle can be studied. There are many 
traffic flow CA models. In this thesis, we wi l l mainly focus on two such models: 
the Nagel and Schreckenberg's highway traffic model (NS) [10] and the Fukui-
Ishibashi's model (FI) [11]. The CA models of Br i lon and Wu [62]，Nagel and 
Hermann [63], Gipps [64] and the model of Takayasu and Takayasu [65] are 
modifications of the NS model for describing real traffic in more details. Note 
that there is no single model that can give all the features in real traffic. 
For research and analysis, results of a physical model or a theory must be 
compared wi th empirical data. Some empirical findings for traffic flow thus are 
worth noting. There are numerous data on traffic. We are mainly concerned 
wi th the functional relationship among the vehicular flux (vehicular flow) the 
average speed v and the vehicular density p. The flux-density relation, called 
the fundamental diagram, is the most important. Empirical flux-density rela-
tions show a discontinuity w i th a reverse-lambda-like structure. The structure 
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suggests that there are at least two different dynamical phases for vehicu-
lar traffic on highway, namely a free-flow phase and a congested phase. By 
removing the data belonging to some moving jams, recent data f rom careful 
empirical observations revealed that there exist two different congested phases, 
the synchronized phase and the stop-and-go phase [66, 67, 68, 69 • 
Therefore, there are three phases in traffic flow. Firstly, the free-flow phase 
is a state in which al l vehicles can move at a high speed which is close to the 
speed l imi t . This phase occurs in the low density regime. Secondly, the stop-
and-go phase occurs in the high density regime. In this phase, a j am occurs 
and some vehicles are moving while another vehicles stop for a certain period 
of t ime. Finally, the synchronized phase occurs at densities between the free-
flow phase and the stop-and-go phase. A flux maximum occurs at intermediate 
density in the synchronized phase. In the synchronized phase, all the vehicles 
are moving w i th a spread in the speed ranging between low speed to the speed 
l imi t . The car density and speed enable the flux in the synchronized phase to 
take on a maximum value. Besides, there are strong correlations between the 
densities on different lanes in the synchronized phase in a multi- lane system 
66, 70 . 
5.2 NS dynamics 
In the NS model, every vehicle takes on a speed v of Vmax + 1 possible values, 
i.e., V G { 0 , 1 , . . • , Vmax}, where Vmax is the speed l imi t on the road. Let Xn 
and Vn be the position and the speed of the n th vehicle, respectively. The gap 
between the n th vehicle and the (n + l ) t h vehicle in front of i t at an instant 
of t ime is dn = Xn+i — + 1. On a system of length of L cells, the movement 
of the vehicles is described by the following set of parallel updating rules: 
1. Acceleration: Vn{t) = min{vn{ t — 1) + 1, Vmax} 
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2. Deceleration to avoid collisions: Vn{t) = m in {vn { t ) , dn{ t ) } 
3. Randomization: w i th a certain probabil i ty p that Vn{t) = max{vn{t)-
1 , 0 } 
4. Movement: Xn{t + 1) = Xn{t) + Vn{t) 
The NS model reproduces some basic features of real traffic by its four-step 
updat ing rules. Step 1 is the general tendency of the drivers to drive as fast 
as possible, wi thout exceeding the speed l imi t . Besides, the drivers have to 
consider the vehicle in front of i t so as to avoid collisions. The restriction is 
given in Step 2. The randomization in Step 3 takes into account the different 
behavior of drivers and is crucial for the formation of jams. Figure 5.1 show 
schematically how the updating rules are applied. 
Simulations of the NS model give some basic features similar to empiri-
cal observations. More precisely, the fundamental diagram is in qualitatively 
agreement w i th empirical observations. But the maximum flux as well as the 
density at which the maximum occurs are both lower than empirical observa-
tions [71]. There are many attempts to modify the basic NS model. Here，we 
consider only the numerical results of the basic NS model. 
We reproduce the numerical simulations of the basic NS model for N ve-
hicles on the road, where the flux of the vehicles is obtained as the product 
of the density and the average speed i.e., cj) = pv w i th p = N/L. Figures 
5.2 and 5.3 show the fundamental diagrams for different values of p and Vmax 
[vmax = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) , respectively. The two phases of vehicular flow are 
clearly shown in the fundamental diagrams. Computer simulations for the NS 
model can be easily carried out while analytical analysis of the model and 
theoretical interpretations of the numerical data are not straightforward. I t 
is because of possible finite-size effects and numerical fluctuations. For par-
allel updating CA rules in the NS model, obtaining exact analytical solution 
for the fundamental diagram has proven to be difficult. Nevertheless, there 
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Configuration at time t 
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— I — 
Movement (Configuration at time t+1) 
Figure 5.1: The schematic diagram of the NS model. The arrow represent a vehicle 
and in the right upper corner is the speed at that instant of time. 
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arc st i l l some approximate analytical theories for the undeterministic cases of 
the NS model. These theories include the site-oriented mean field theory [72], 
car-oriented mean field theory [73], etc.. 
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Figure 5.2: The fundamental diagram of the NS model for different values of p 
{p = {0.0,0.25,0.50,0.75}) . Other parameters are Vmax = 3 and L = 1000 
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5.3 FI dynamics 
Similar to the NS model, Fukui and Ishibashi (FI) proposed a CA model of 
highway traffic using the following parallel updating rules: 
1. Avoid collisions: Vn(t) = rnin(vmax： dn{t)) 
2. Randomization: w i th a certain probabil i ty p, Vn{t) = min{vmax — ^： dn{t)) 
3. Movement: Xn{t + 1) = Xn(t) + Vn{t) 
Here Vn is the speed of the n th vehicle and i t can take on a value in { 0 , 1 , … , t W c } , 
w i th Vmax being the speed l imi t . Xn is the position of the n th vehicle and 
dn = Xn+i — Xn + 1 is the gap between the n th vehicle and the (n + l ) t h vehi-
cle. The F I model allows cars to accelerate rapidly [2]. Step 1 states that all 
the drivers want to drive at the speed l imi t i f spacing permits. According to 
Step 2, the probabilistic random delay is applied only to the vehicles which are 
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Figure 5.4: The fundamental diagram of the FI model for different values of p 
{p = {0.0,0.25,0.50,0.75}) . Other parameters are Vmax = 3 and L = 1000 
traveling at the speed l imi t . This reflects that drivers are more cautions when 
driving at the speed l imi t and they may apply the brake more often. There are 
two differences between the F I model and the NS model. The increase in speed 
is not necessarily gradual and the random delay is applied only to the vehicles 
traveling at the speed l imi t in the F I model. These have the effects of making 
the flux of the F I model higher than that of the NS model. We reproduce the 
fundamental diagrams of the F I model for different values of p in Fig. 5.4 and 
for different values of Vmax in Fig. 5.5. Clearly, the maximum flux as well as 
the crit ical density is higher than those in the NS model. As the dynamics of 
the F I model is slightly simpler than the NS model, exact analytical theories 
have been developed for arbitrary Vmax and p in the form of site-oriented and 
car-oriented mean field theories [74，75, 76 . 
In the following Chapters, we wil l apply the two dynamics to study some 
traffic flow models . 
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Figure 5.5: The fundamental diagram of the FI model for different values of Vmax 
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Chapter 6 
One-lane traffic flow models 
with anticipation effects 
For the NS and F I traffic flow models described previously, the mot ion of 
the cars at a t ime step depends only on the state of the sites, part icular the 
spacing in front of a car, at that t ime step. In these models, drivers do not 
anticipate the movement of the car in front, although such movement takes 
place simultaneously. In real traffic situations, a driver actually decides the 
speed of his car by including an anticipation of the movement of car ahead in 
his decision. In general, the mot ion of the car in front leads to an enhanced 
inter-car spacing and hence an increase in the speed. In this Chapter, we study 
the effects of anticipation of car movement on the NS model and F I model. 
Recently, Wi i et al [77] studied numerically the NS models incorporat ing 
the anticipation of car movement. They found that the traffic flux exhibits a 
maximum w i th value that is higher then the basic NS model. Such a result 
represents a better description of results obtained in observations of highway 
traffic in Germany [71 . 
In this Chapter, we propose two models using F I dynamics incorporating 
the anticipation of the movement of the car ahead. In Sec. 6.1, we review the 
work of Wu et al [77] and reproduce their numerical results. In Sec. 6.2, our 
models using the F I dynamics are presented. The models are defined in Sec. 
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6.2.1, w i th numerical and analytical results presented in Sec. 6.2.2 and Sec. 
6.2.3, respectively. A summary is given in Sec. 6.3. Note the results of basic 
F I model are included for comparison. 
6.1 Review 
6.1.1 Model using NS dynamics 
We consider a one-lane model consisting of L sites and the tota l number of 
, c a r s on the road is N. Each car is labelled by an integer n {n = 1, 2 , N ) 
f rom left to right. The cars are travell ing from left to right. Recall that in 
the basic NS model the movement of the n th car follows the parallel updating 
rules: 
1. Acceleration: Vn{t) = m in {vn { t — 1) + 1, Vmax} 
2. Deceleration to avoid collisions: Vn{t) = min{vn{ t ) , dn{t)} 
3. Randomization: w i th a certain probabil i ty p that Vn{t) = max{vn{t)— 
1,0} 
4. Movement: Xn{t + 1) = Xn{t) + Vn{t) 
Here Vn{t) G {0,1, ...,Vmax} is the speed of the n th car at t ime t w i th Vmax 
being the speed l imi t of the road, Xn{t) denotes the position of the n th car and 
dn{t) denotes the inter-car spacing between the n th and (n + l ) t h cars at t ime 
~t, 1 • 6 > ^  
dn{t) = X n ^ i { t ) - X n { t ) + l . (6.1) 
According to Ref.[77], anticipation is introduced through a 'intended speed' 
+ 1) of the (n + l ) t h car at time 力 + 1 given by 
4^+1(亡 + 1) = rnin{vmax _ 1，〜+i⑷，ma:r{0，ci时 i⑷-1}}. (6.2) 
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Clearly, Eq.(6.2) represents the basic NS dynamics including the random delay 
of the (n + l ) t h car. The second rule of the basic NS dynamics is then changed 
to: 
2'. Deceleration to avoid collisions: Vn{t) 二 min{vn{t), dn{t) + 力 + 1)} 
Thus, 力 + 1) represents the smallest movement of the (n + l ) t h car and 
therefore no collisions wi l l occur. 
6.1.2 Results 
For one-lane traffic flow models, the fundamental diagram is one of the most 
important features. I t gives the traffic flux as a function of car density. The 
fundamental diagram of the basic NS model is consistent w i th the empirical 
results but the crit ical value is much lower, for both flux and density. However, 
in Ref. [77] w i th the same simulation conditions as that of the basic NS model, 
the results are much closer to the empirical observations. Thus, i t is more 
realistic than the basic NS model. We reproduce the simulation of Wu's work 
in Fig. 6.1, where the results of basic NS model are included for comparison. 
From Fig. 6.1 i t is observed that the maximum flux is higher than that of the 
basic NS model. Our results are consistent w i th these in Ref. [77]. Moreover, 
the anticipation model also gives the hysteresis effect of the traffic flow [78, 79 
when there is no probabilistic delay, i.e., p = 0. As for the basic NS model 
there is no hsyteresis at all. 
6.2 Models using FI dynamics 
6.2.1 Models 
We consider a one-lane traffic flow model w i th L sites and N cars on the road. 
Then the density p is given by p 二 N!L. The cars are labelled n from left 
(n = 1) to right [n = N), and the cars are travelling from left to right. A car 
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Figure 6.1: Fundamental diagram, average flux as a function of car density, of the 
model of Wu et al [77]. Here, Vmax 二 5 ， = 0.3 and L = 1000. 
is allowed to move at a maximum speed of Vmax in a t ime step i f the spacing 
in front of the car permits. Here Vmax is the speed l imi t of the road. For a car 
w i th allowed spacing that i t can take on the maximum speed tWc，there is a 
probabil i ty p that i t w i l l only travel w i th speed v^ax — 1- In the F I model, this 
delay probabil i ty only affects the cars w i th maximum speed. I t describes that 
drivers moving in high speed become more cautious because of safety reasons. 
In the basic F I dynamics, the drivers only consider the spacing in front at the 
current t ime step, without any prediction of the motion of the car in front. 
Using the same notations described above, the spacing between the n th and 
(n — l ) t h cars is given by 
4 ⑷ = 知 + 1 ⑴ — M O + l . (6.3) 
Now, we introduce anticipation into the F I model [80]. Considering the 
delay effect of random delay and to avoid collisions, the anticipated motion 
is that the car ahead can only move at most (vmax — 1) sites. We study two 
anticipation schemes. 
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Model A: This is a more conservative anticipation scheme. The updat ing rules 
are as follows: 
1. Ant ic ipat ion: To avoid collisions and be more conservative, the anticipa-
t ion on the ( n + l ) t h car in front of the n th car uses the basic F I dynamics 
w i th delay and adopts a wider spacing between cars. The intended speed 
is given by 
力 + 1) = rnin{vmax 一 1, max{0, d 时 i ⑴ - ( 6 . 4 ) 
2. Speed update: The speed is then updated by the current spacing and 
the anticipated motion of the car in front. Note that the probabilistic 
delay is applied only to cars that are allowed to move at Vmax- Thus, the 
speed is 
min{vmax, dn{t) + +1)}， w i th probabil i ty 1 - p 
Vn{t + l) 二 < 
、min{vmax - 1, dn{t) + + l ) } , w i th probabil i ty p. 
(6.5) 
3. Movement: Therefore, the actual movement of the n th car is given by 
Xn{t + 1) 二 00n(t) + Vn{t + 1). (6.6) 
Equations(6.5) and (6.6) give a set of equations for the t ime evolution of each 
car in Model A. 
Model B: For a not-so-conservative anticipation scheme, i t would be sufficient 
to replace Eq.(6.4) by 
力 + 1) = min{vmax — l,max{0,dn+i(t)}}. (6.7) 
Clearly, the intended speed in Eq.(6.7) would in general lead to a higher speed 
than Eq.(6.4). Now, Eqs.(6.5) and (6.6) w i th the intended speed defined in 
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Figure 6.2: Fundamental diagram, average flux as a function of car density, of 
Model A for various tVnax，with p = 0.3 and L = 1000. 
Eq.(6.7) constitute another set of equations for the t ime evolution of each car 
in Model B. 
6.2.2 Results and Discussion 
We have carried out numerical simulations on the models. We set the length 
of the road to be L — 1000 sites. Each site can be taken to correspond to a 
length of 7.5m on a road [2]. I t has been shown that v^ax = 5 is the normal 
free-flow velocity in real traffic and we choose p = 0.3 as the random delay 
probability. We focus mainly on the fundamental diagram of our models and 
make comparison w i th the basic F I model. The results are obtained after the 
system has reached a steady state and our discussions below are based on 
the results of the case of Vmax = 5. We also studied other values of Vmax for 
reference. 
In Fig. 6.2, we show the fundamental diagram obtained by simulations on 
Model A for Vmax = {1，2,…,5} . The results of the basic F I model w i th the 
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Figure 6.3: Space-time diagram for car density p = 0.05, where p = 0.3, Vmax = 5 
and L — 1000. The dot indicates a car at an instant time and space. 
same parameters are also included for comparison. Model A gives a higher 
flux in a range of densities and there are three clearly distinguished density 
ranges corresponding to the three phases in the fundamental diagram observed 
in traffic flow data [2]. These phases are the free-flow phase at low car densi-
ties, the synchronized phase at intermediate car densities and the stop-and-go 
phase at high car densities. In Figs. 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, we show the space-time 
diagrams corresponding to different regimes of car density. For low densities 
(Fig. 6.3), there is no blockage and i t is the free-flow phase. Fig. 6.5 clearly 
shows the stop-and-go phase at high car densities. For intermediate car den-
sities (Fig. 6.4)，the distr ibution of cars on the road is much even than that 
in Fig. 6.5. I t gives the synchronized state. In the synchronized state, every 
car is moving and none of them is moving at the maximum speed and none 
of them stops. Fig. 6.6 shows the speed distributions of cars at different car 
densities. In particular, the results for p = 0.35 show that the speeds of the 
cars are distributed between t) 二 1 to w 二 4 
As observed in Fig. 6.2, there is a range at low car densities where the 
Chapter 6 One-lane traffic flow models with anticipation effects 70 




200 l i _ _ _ _ i _ i 鎮 





5 0 0 I;;;丨丨丨丨：丨丨:丨丨：：丨:丨;逾丨：：;丨丨丨：；丨設丨:丨丨:強 
0 100 200 300 
time 
Figure 6.4: Space-time diagram for car density p = 0.35. 
0 r - ^ i V l l " , | , | 
：“"i , 、 | II , ' - „ „ | , , , z ： : 
100 ^ ‘ ,„iiiii_丨丨"""!"""', ‘ ‘‘ ,„,,„‘I""“‘I'll" ,11-iii 
,.z,•：：Z 
. 昆 > , " “ ‘ , « ‘‘ ‘ ,1‘ 
3。。:：：zz“iZ ，,,::::I”.•-I：：^ 
4 0 0 - i , , " “ ： i Z , ； Z Z 
.1 j 'I “ , , ： 丨 z : Z i : : , " 
, ' ,z" ' , ；I:;；； 、 m " 丨丨丨i-i!j 
500 II, ‘I I、"，::："：：：：Z："" iihii …丨"'I——,』i丨丨丨II丨I""""』丨丨” 
0 100 200 300 
time 
Figure 6.5: Space-time diagram for density p = 0.60. 
Chapter 6 One-lane traffic flow models with anticipation effects 71 
0.8 I I I i I 1 p.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Q g _ density = 0.05 q g _ density = 0.27 _ 
3 0.4 - -0.4 - -a-
E? 
0 .2 - - 0 .2 - -
0 1 1 ‘ 1 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.4 - density = 0.35 - 一 density = 0.60 
0 . 6 - -
I 0.3 - -
O y, 
] J .4 - -
o 0 .2 - -
H— 
0 2 - -。i JUL 
Q I I I I I ! Q I I I ！ I I I 
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 
speed speed 
Figure 6.6: The speed distributions for Model A at four different car densities 
corresponding to different regimes of the fundamental diagram. 
flux increases almost linearly w i th car density. The speed of the cars is almost 
always equal to Vmax- This is because the wide spacings at low densities gives 
a high speed and the flux is then basically determined only by the density. 
W i t h the delay probability, the distr ibution of speed at low densities (e.g., 
p = 0.05 in Fig. 6.6) shows that most of the cars move at the maximum speed 
{vmax = 5) w i th a fraction of 0.3 at the speed (vmax — ^), as expected for p = 0.3 
when there is no blockage of cars. Such free-flow phase extends to a higher 
car density in Model A (up to p 〜0.3) than that in the basic F I model (up to 
p 〜0.15) due to the fact that anticipation makes the spacing wider and most 
of the cars sti l l move wi th speed Vmax at densities where the basic F I model 
already exhibits the blockage of cars. In the intermediate range of densities, 
the spacing between cars becomes less and then the speed drops as the density 
increases. Figure 6.7 shows that there is a steep drop in the average speed 
in the intermediate range of densities. The flux, however, is sti l l higher than 
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the basic F I model. This is because the intended speed given by Eq.(6.4) is 
not zero in this range of densities. Recall that in the synchronized state, the 
system self-organizes into a phase in which each car, in general, is moving, but 
the speed is lower than the free-flow phase. From Fig. 6.6, the speed of the 
cars spread widely between 1 and {vmax — 1), so all the cars are in motion. In 
the high density region {p > 0,5)，Model A and the F I model exhibit have the 
same features. Both are in the stop-and-go phase w i th much blockage and the 
flux decreases linearly w i th an increase in density. Some of the cars are blocked 
during the flow and the density only allows the speed of about 1 for the cars, 
as shown in the speed distr ibut ion in Fig. 6.6 for p 二 0.60. Therefore, the 
anticipation has no effects on Model A for densities higher than 0.5. These 
feature follows from the intended speed given by Eq.(6.4). In the steady state, 
the gap between two consecutive cars is either 1 or 0 for > 0.5, thus the 
intended speed defined by Eq.(6.4) becomes zero because of the，，(in+i 一 1" 
term. Therefore, anticipation gives zero speed for the anticipated motion of 
the car in front, as in the basic F I model. Note that the three different phases 
can also be observed in Fig. 6.7. 
According to Fig. 6.2, we have a maximum flux at about 1.15 corresponding 
to the density of around 0.275. This is significantly higher than that of the 
basic F I model. We illustrate the situation on a space-time diagram at p = 0.27 
(Fig. 6.8). There is an even distr ibution of cars on the road and most of the 
cars are moving w i th speed of either Vmax or {vmax — !)• W i t h the high density 
and high speed, the flux，generally, is much higher than in other region of car 
densities. The increase in the flux is due to the anticipation of the car in front, 
so that the cars can attain a higher average speed than in the basic F I model. 
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 show the fundamental diagram and speed-density di-
agram for Model B，in which drivers use a more aggressive scheme of anticipa-
tion. Model B gives a higher maximum flux than Model A does at a slightly 
higher car density. Moreover, the average speed is also higher as expected. In 
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Fig. 6.9, the flux becomes independent of Vmax{ymax > 2) only for p > \ . For 
p > blockage of cars occurs as expected from Eq.(6.7). The upper panel in 
Fig. 6.9 shows the distr ibut ion of speeds in three typical densities, for which 
the three phases of traffic flow as discussed above are observed. The features 
of Model B are quite similar to those of Model A at low car density region. A t 
low car density, the flow is the same for all models because of the wide spread 
of cars on the road. As for the higher density regime, since the anticipation 
scheme of Model B leads to a higher intended speed for the car ahead, the 
flux in Model B is higher than that of Model A. For p > 0.5, anticipation st i l l 
affects the system when there are st i l l cars w i th at least one spacing in front 
(i.e., 3n,s.t.dn 0 ). As a result，the flux at high car densities is enhanced 
and the flux is much higher than that of the basic F I model. 
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Figure 6.9: Fundamental diagram and speed distribution, corresponding to different 
regimes for Model B with p = 0.3 and L = 1000. 
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6.2.3 Mean Field Theory 
Various mean field theories have been proposed for traffic flow models [11， 
72, 74, 75, 76，81, 82, 83]. For the basic F I model, a site-oriented mean field 
theory [75] and a car-oriented mean field theory [74, 76] have been developed 
for arbitrary Vmax and p. Here, we follow the work of Wang et. al. [74 
on the basic F I model and develop a mean field theory for the fundamental 
diagram for both Model A and Model B. The theory is based on a microscopic 
description on the time evolution of the intercar spacings at the asymptotic 
steady state and the results are in good agreement w i th numerical results for 
arbitrary values of Vmax > 2 and p. 
Model A : Let Cn(t) be the number of empty sites in front of the n th car 
at t ime t. According to Eq.(6.4), the allowed moving spacings for the n th 
car, i.e., the spacings between the nth and (n + l ) t h cars plus the anticipated 
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movement of the {n + l ) t h car, is 
人⑴二 ⑷ + C奸1⑷-1. (6.8) 
The average distance between neighboring cars for given density p can be 
represented by 三 ^ ^ ^ — ^ — 1. The average allowed moving spacings 
becomes 
A = 2C-1^2{--1)-1 = - - 3 . (6.9) 
P P 
The allowed moving sites in front of the n th car at t ime 力 + 1 is given by 
An{t + 1 ) = An{t) + 〜+2 ⑷—Vn{ t ) . (6.10) 
As in the steady state, the cars wi l l distribute more evenly and we can approx-
imate An{t + 1) as 
An{t + 1) 二 An{t) + 一 〜⑷. （6.11) 
Therefore, the speed of the n th car becomes 
‘An{t) i f An{t) < Vmax " 1 
Vnit + l) = Vmax — 1 (withprobabi l i ty p) i f An(t) > v^ax 
Vmax (wi thprobabi l i ty 1 - p) i f An{t) > Vmax 
\ 
(6.12) 
The average speed at t ime t is 
1 N 1 f 
” 二 E 4 � + E ( ^ ― - p ) >. 
n = l A,i(0<fmai-1 Anit)>Vrnax > 
(6.13) 
The average speed is given by summations over two different types of allowed 
moving spacings, named long spacings (V^ > Vmax) and short spacings {An < 
'^max — 1). 
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Let Nm{t) be the number of cars at t ime t w i th m allowed moving spacings. 
The probabi l i ty that a car is found to have m allowed moving sites ahead is 
given by 
Pm(t) = ^ (6.14) 
The number of long spacings Niongif) at t ime t is given by N—⑴=Zlm^M K , ) ， 
and the probabil i ty of f inding a car w i th a long spacing is Piong {t) = ^long (亡)/见 
Similarly, we have the number of short spacings Nshort{t) at t ime t as Nshort { t ) = 
Njni f ) and the probabil i ty of f inding a car w i th short spacing is Pshort ( , ) = 
Nshort {t) / N . Thus, the average car speed in Eq.(6.4) can be expressed in terms 
of Pm(f) as 
Vmax 一1 
V{t) = ^ m-Pm{t)^{Vmax-p)Plon9{t). (6.15) 
m二 1 
Next, we construct the t ime evolution equations for the allowed moving 
spacings, An i t ) . Consider the case in which the allowed moving spacings of 
the n th car is short, i.e., An{t) < Vmax — 1. From Eqs.(6.11) and (6.12)，if 
A i + i ⑴ < Vmax — 1，we have 
An{t-{-l) 二 An{t) Vn+l{t) - Vn{t) 
二 An{t) ^ An+i{t) - An{t) 
= A i + 1 ⑴， 
i.e., 
A n { t + 1 ) < Vmax " 1- (6.16) 
I f An+i{t) > Vmax, then 
=Vn+l{t), 
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i.e., 
Vmax — 1 w i th probabil i ty p 
An{t + 1) = (6.17) 
Vmax w i th probabil i ty 1 — p. 
V 
Now, consider the case in which the allowed moving spacings of the n th car 
is long, i.e., An{t) > Vmax- From Eqs.(6.11) and (6.12), i f A i + i ⑷ < Vmax _ 1， 
then 
A n ( t + 1 ) = ^^⑴+^；时工⑴一〜⑴ 
= A n ( t ) - h A n + i ( t ) - V n ( t ) , 
and thus 
z 
Vmax — 1 w i th probabil i ty p 
An{t-\-l)=An{t)+An^l{t)-< 
Vmax w i th probabil i ty 1 — p. 
(6.18) 
Since < Vmax — 1，Eq.(6.18) becomes 
Vmax — 1 wi th probabil i ty p 
A n { t I ) < An{t) + Vmax - I < 
Vmax w i th probabil i ty 1 — p. 
\ 
Thus, we obtain 
Ajiit) w i th probabil ity p 
A n { t + l ) < (6.19) 
An{t) — 1 wi th probabil ity I — p. 
\ 
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I f An+i{t) > Vmax, then 
An{t^l) 二 An{t) + Vn+l{t) - Vn{t) 
/ 
^max - {ymax " l ) w i th probabil i ty p{l - p) 
=An{t) + 0 w i th probabil i ty p^ + {1 - p)^ 
(vmax - 1) - Vmax w i th probabil i ty p{l — p). 
< 
Thus, 
1 wi th probabil i ty p{l — p) 
An{t + 1) = An{t) + 0 wi th probabil i ty p^-{-{1 - pf (6.20) 
—1 wi th probabil i ty p{l — p). 
V 
Equations (6.16)-(6.20) give the time evolution of 人 ⑴ . T h e equations, 
when coupled w i th Eq.(6.13) or (6.15), give the t ime evolution of the average 
speed V{t). 
We first consider the high car density case. As described in Sec. 6.2.2 
Model A gives the same features as the basic F I model when p > i.e., 
anticipation does not have any effects. Then from [74], the average speed V is 
given by 
V = - - 1 , for p > i (6.21) 
P 
The proof of Eq.(6.21) goes as follows. For high car densities {p > the 
allowed moving spacing becomes equal to the inter-car spacing in Ref.[74]，i.e., 
An{t) = Cn(t), since ⑴ = 0 . So in the asymptotic steady state of the 
traffic flow, all the allowed moving spacings become short, i.e., 
An{t) < Vmax — 1， Vn. (6.22) 
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From Eq.(6.16), for all allowed moving spacing shorter than Vmax, 
An{t-hl) = An^i{t), Vn. (6.23) 
As t ime evolves, the system reaches a state in which all the allowed moving 
spacings are short. Then we have, for Vmax > 2 
T, L - N 1 , 1 
V 二 了 = - p - 、 
The t ime evolution of An{t) ensures that in the high density case the steady 
state is approached asymptotically regardless of the in i t ia l state of the traffic 
flow. The proof of which has been given in Refs. [74] and [76 . 
As for the low car density case (p < p < ^ ^ ^ for all Vmax > 2 the 
average allowed moving spacing is 
A = 2 ( - ) - l 
P 
> 2 ( 2 - 1 ) - 1 
= 1 
^ � max — 1-
In the asymptotic steady state (t — oo), we obtain 
Anit) > Vmax 一 1, Vn. (6.24) 
Consider the probabil i ty of finding a car having m allowed moving spacings, 
we have 
PO 二 Pi =…=Pvma.-2 = 0. 
I t follows that 
Pshort 二 Pvma:c-1 
and 
Plong = 1 一 Pvmax-l-
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Therefore, we obtain the average speed as 
Vmax—l 
V ⑴ 二 m . Prn(t) + (V謹z — p)Pi。ng(t) 
m=l 
~ {'^max — + {'^max — P)尸tWaj-l 
i.e., 
7 ⑴ = ( ” 蘭 - P ) - (1 一 1. (6.25) 
The problem of finding V ( t ) becomes that of finding Pvmax-i in the asymptotic 
state. 
Define iV)力士i to be the number of allowed moving spacings changing from 
j at t ime 亡 to j 土 1 at t ime t + l . The probabil i ty of finding an allowed moving 
spacing w i th length j at t ime t and length j 士 1 at t ime 亡 + 1 is defined as 
杜 1 ⑴ E ^ 
二 Nj{t~) Nj 一 仕 他 
—L iV 八 Nj{t) )• 
For simplicity, we assume that the spacing distr ibution is independent of each 
other [84]. Then from Eqs.(6.16) and (6.17), we have 
N. it) 二（1 — p 肌 + 尸””脳+1 + . . . ) (6.26) 
and by the definition of •士i(亡)， 
W"”爪…-1—”爪Q 力 ） = ( 6 . 2 7 ) 
Similarly, from Eqs.(6.19) and (6.20), we also have 
A^ v - i ( t ) = (1 — 爪u广 1 + ( i _ + + • • . ) (6.28) 
丄、Vniax 
and 
州 t w H t W广 1 ⑴ = — + (1 — P)pPlong. 
二 O^-PlPv^APvi^-l+PPlong). (6.29) 
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So f o r w h e r e j > Vmax, i f An{t) 二 j > Vmax a n d A 奸 1 ⑴ 二 Vmax - 1, 
Eq.(6.18) gives 
/ 
Vmax — 1 w i th probabi l i ty p 
= j + Vmax - 1 - < 
Vmax w i th probabil i ty 1 — p 
\ Z 
j + Vmax - 1 - Vmax + 1 w i th probabil i ty p 
= < 
j + Vmax — 1 + Vmax w i th probabil i ty 1 - p \ f 
j w i th probabil i ty p 
二 < 
j — 1 w i th probabil i ty 1 — p. 
\ 
Similarly, for the case of An{t) = j > Vmax and An-\-i{t) > Vmax, Eq.(6.20) gives 
f 
1 wi th probabil i ty p(l — p) 
An(t + 1) = i + < 0 wi th probabil i ty + (1 - p)^ 
—1 wi th probabil ity p(l — p). 
、 
Hence, we obtain 
、 「 ； ) ⑷ = ( 1 - + P h + Pv^a. + l + • • . ) ] (6.30) 
and 
、 这 力 ) 二 - P) (Pvm.. + + l + • . • ) (6.31) 
Thus the probabilities VFj—j±i ⑷ are given by 
T y j . — � = { l - p ) P j { P v m a . - l + P P l o n g ) , j > Vmax (6.32) 
and 
Wj^j+l{t) 二 p ( l — p)PjPiong, j > Vmax (6.33) 
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Now the asymptotic steady state should satisfy the following conditions 
评 — 1 〜 ⑷ = 队 〜 - 1 ⑷ (6.34) 
and 
二 py—1 力 .⑴， j > Vmax- (6.35) 
These are the detailed balance conditions. Substitut ing Eqs.(6.27), (6.29)， 
(6.32) and (6.33) into Eqs. (6.34) and (6.35), we have 
Pvmax — 1 — P”ma:c-1 /n 
and 
Pj ~~ -^Umax-l) _ ^ • . nrr\ 
S ^ = D ； n ~ ~ ~ D V = … ^ > ^max (6.37) 尸j-1 Krnax-l + P[丄 _ 尸IW广 i j 
where a is a constant depending on •广 i only. Thus, from Eqs.(6.36) and 
(6.37), we obtain 
(y 
Pvjnax 二 ( — )Pvrncix-l, ^Vrnax+l = ^^Vrnax J •  •， — Oc ‘ ^ Vrnax ' 
P 
(6.38) 
I t follows from Eq.(6.9) and the definition of Pj that 
_ 2 ⑴ 
i = - - 3 = j P j . (6.39) 
P j-Vjnax-l 
Substituting Eq.(6.38) into Eq.(6.39), 
^ — ('^ max _ L-mux-l + '^ maxPvjnax + (.Umax + )^-Pvrnax + . . . 
Q 
=(Vmax - —1 + Vrnax-Pvr„u.-l + (^'max + 
and we obtain 
Ap(l - q)2 
户口'…—1 = + i w a ( l - q ) + ( L w - l ) p ( l - a)2- ⑴.^ 。) 
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Substi tut ing a into Eq.(6.40), we get a quadratic equation for Pvmax-i after 
simplification: 
(1 - P ) P L a . - i + ”藝 + 尸tw广 1 -P = 0. (6.41) 
Solving the above equation gives a non-negative root 
p — ymax - A- 2p-\- y / { A - V 而 + 如 Y + 知(1 — p) , 、 
尸 — 1 = • ….4々 
Finally, substitut ing Eq.(6.42) into Eq.(6.25) gives the average speed at low 
car densities as 
、 Vmax - A - 2 p + y / i A - Vmax + 2p)2 + 4p{l - p) 
V{t OO) = Vmax " P 
一 ^max - 2 / p + 3 - 2 p + V ( 2 / V - 3 - ” 丽 + 2pY + 知 (1 
~~ ” macc — P — 2 
二 Vmax — 3 + 2 / p - - 3 - Vmaa^ + 2 p ) 2 + 4 ^ ( 1 - p) ( 6 明 
2 
Combining the results for low and high densities, the speed-density relation 
of Model A w i th stochastic delay for Vmax > 2 is 
‘Vmax-S+2/p-y/{2/p-3-Vmax +2p)2+4p(l-p) ^^^ Q < yO < ^ 
V{t -> oo) = ^ 
i - 1 for ^ < p < l . 
p I —厂—— 
V 
(6.44) 
For the case of = 2 , Eq.(6.44) reads 
‘2/p-l-v^(2/p-5+2p)2+4p(l-p) for 0 < " < i 
2 — ‘ — 2 
V{t -^oo)= \ (6.45) 
》 - l for | < P < 1 . 
、 
Figure 6.11 compares the analytical results (Eq.(6.45)) for Vmax = 2 for dif-
ferent values of the random delay probability w i th numerical results, good 
agreement is found. 
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Figure 6.11: Speed-density diagram for Model A wi th Vmax = 2 and different values 
of the stochastic delay p. The points w i th different symbols represent the results from 
numerical simulations, while the curves represent the average speed from Eq.(6.45) 
w i th different values ofp between p = 0 to p = 1. 
Model B : According to ant ic ipat ion scheme in Model B as given by the 
intended speed in Eq.(6.7), the allowed moving spacing for the n t h car is 
Az⑷二 C；⑴+ CWi ⑷， (6.46) 
which implies that 
_ _ 1 
i 二 — 1 ) = ^ j P j . (6.47) 
j—Vmax — 1 
Following exactly the same calculation scheme as carried out for Model A , we 
obtain the same set of equations (Eqs.(6.16), (6.17), (6.19)，(6.20)) for the t ime 
evolution of An{t) and of average speed, V{t), in the asymptotic steady state. 
For high car densities case, i.e., p > the average allowed moving 
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spacing satisfies 
i - 2(7 
< 2 广而2+1 - 1) 
二 '^max — 1-
In the asymptotic steady state, all the allowed moving spacings become short, 
i.e., 
A n { t ) > Vmax — 1 , V n . ( 6 . 4 8 ) 
I t follows from Eq.(6.16) that 
An{t+l)=An{t), Vn. (6.49) 
Therefore, we obtain 
2(L - N) = ； ^ 人 ⑷ 
n 
2 
< N(Vmax -1)， P > — , 
”max十丄 
and the speed at high densities is 
二 ^ E ^ - w 
n 




= 2 ( ^ - 1 ) , P > (6.50) 
P ^max十丄 
For low car densities, i.e., p < ”二+” the asymptotic speed is given, after 
similar calculations for Model A, by 
…各 � V m a 工 - A - 2 p + ^ / { A - Vmax + 2p)2 + 4p{l — p) 
V(t -> OO) = Vmax —P ^ ， 
(6.51) 
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where i 二 2 ( 卜 1) for Model B. Thus, for p < ^ we have 
、 — ^max - 2 ( l / p - 1) — 2p + VT2(l/ya — 1) — V^ax + + 知 (1 — p) 
y OOJ — Vmax ~ P ^ 
Vmaa: - 2 + 2 / p - — 2 — V丽 + + 4p(l — p) 
= 2 • (6-52) 
Put t ing the results Eqs.(6.50) and (6.52) together, the speed-density rela-
t ion of Model B w i th stochastic delay for Vmax >2 is 
‘Vmax-2+2/p-y/i2/p-2-Vmax +2p)2+4p(l —p) for () < < 2 
2 — P — Vmax+l 
V{t o o ) = < 
- 1) for — ^ < p < l . 
\ P ’ Vmax+l — r — 
< 
(6.53) 
For Vmax = 2, Eq.(6.53) reads 
‘ 2 / p - v / ( 2 / p - 4 + 2 p ) 2 + 4 p ( l - p ) f o r 0 < p < 2 
V{t - >oo ) = < (6.54) 
- 1 ) for I < p < 1. 
V 
Figure 6.12 compares the analytical results (Eq.(6.54)) for Vmax 二 2 for dif-
ferent values of the random delay probabil ity w i th numerical results. The 
agreement is, in general, good wi th deviations at intermediate densities. The 
discrepancies may be due to the assumption that the car spacings are inde-
pendent of each other. By taking into account the conditional probabil i ty of 
a spacing of length j in front of a spacing of length k, one may improve the 
analytical results [85 . 
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Figure 6.12: Speed-density diagram for Model B with Vmax = 2 and different values 
of the stochastic delay p. The points with different symbols represent the results of 
numerical simulations, while the curves represent the average speed obtained from 
Eq.(6.54) with different values of p between p = 0 to p = 1. 
6.3 Summary 
In summary, we have incorporated the effects of anticipation in the F I model. 
We have carried out numerical simulations on the models. We have found that 
the maximum flux of our models is higher than the basic F I model and occurs 
at a higher crit ical car density. We have clearly observed the three phases of 
traffic flow, the free-flow phase at low car densities, the synchronized phase at 
intermediate car densities and the stop-and-go phase at high car densities in 
both models. Moreover, we have developed a mean field theory for both models 
in the steady state. The analytical results are found to be in good agreement 
w i th numerical results for all Vmax > 2 and p. Table 6.1 summarizes the 
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analytical results of our two models and of the basic F I model [74 . 
Vmax-2+2/p-^{2/p-2-Vmax+2py+ip{l-p) Z ^ ^ 3 2 
^ 5 tor (J < P < -—XT 
Basic F I V{t -> oo) = — — 
model w i th 2 ( i - 1) for — ^ < p < 1. 
, \ ^P ‘ V m a x + l — r — 
random 
delay [74] 
‘Vmax-3+2/p-y/{2/p-^-Vmax +2p)^+4p{l-p) ^^^ 0 < p < -
F I model ! / ( 力 o o ) = j ^ - - 2 
w i th an- i _ 1 for ^ < p < 1. 
p 2 一 ‘ 一 
t ic ipat ion 
(Model A) 
F I model V{t oo) = J ‘ “ -
w i th an- - 1) for — ^ < p < 1. 
... \ ^P ‘ Vmax+l — r — 
t ic ipat ion 
(Model B) 
Table 6.1: Analytical results for the basic F I model and F I models with anticipation 
proposed in this Chapter. 
Chapter 7 
Two-route Models with Global 
Information 
Recently, the complexity in physical and social systems has attracted much at-
tent ion among researchers. For these systems, i t is desirable to have real-time 
information and/or to be able to make short-term forecast of their dynam-
ics. Traffic flow problems fal l natural ly into this class of problems [86]. In 
real situations, there always exist two or more possible routes connecting two 
places, and so road users are required to choose a route according to some 
criteria depending on the drivers, e.g. some may take a route that he believes 
would minimize the travel t ime. In some cases, the road users can only observe 
the traffic situation of their possible routes at the start ing point of the routes 
by eye, and they make their decision mostly according to their own observa-
tion. W i t h the rapid developments of information technology, communication 
networks nowadays can provide real t ime information on the route conditions 
using various message signs and boards on the road, on-board computer, radio 
broadcasts or online images through the internet. The road users can then 
use the information, which is much informative than before, to choose one 
desirable route. Since there is much information to be obtained on the road, 
we need to consider what kind of information to provide to road users so that 
the road users can minimize their travel t ime and the roads can be efficiently 
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used. In this Chapter, we wi l l compare the results between models in which 
the instantaneous average speed of the routes and the latest transit t ime of 
the roads are used as global information. We also investigate the subsequent 
dynamics for models w i th the two kinds of information. 
In Sec. 7.1, we review the work of Wahle et al. [86]. We then propose our 
model in Sec. 7.2.1 in which the instantaneous average speed is announced 
instead of the latest transit t ime. In Sec. 7.3 we study the models using the 
F I dynamics, for which a simple mean field theory is proposed in Sec. 7.3.3. 
A summary of the Chapter is given in Sec. 7.4. 
7.1 Review: Two-route model with global in-
formation using NS dynamics 
7.1.1 Announcing transit time as global information 
While most traffic flow models do not consider the decision making of the 
drivers based on a global information, Wahle et al [86] have recently studied 
such decision making dynamics wi th in a CA traffic flow model. For single-lane 
traffic, the road is subdivided into cells of length 7.5m. Each cell is either 
empty or occupied by at most one vehicle at a given instant of time. Each 
vehicle has its own speed represented by the number of sites to be travelled 
in a t ime step v E {0，1, ".,Vmax}, where Vmax is the speed l imi t of the road. 
Suppose there are two routes, A and B，with the same length L and speed 
l imi t Vmax, connecting two places. In every time step, there is a vehicle at the 
entrance wait ing to enter the system. The driver has to choose one route to 
enter for traveling to the destination. The situation is schematically shown in 
Fig. 7.1. After entering the route, the motion of the vehicles is governed by 
the NS dynamics [10] wi th the following parallel updating rules as described 
in Sec. 5.2: 
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1. Acceleration: v — min{v + 1, Vmax) 
2. Deceleration to avoid accidents: v' — min{v, gap) 
3. Randomization: w i th a certain probabil i ty p that v" = max{v' — 1,0) 
4. Movement: x — x -^v" 
where the gap refers to the spacing between two vehicles. 
Moreover, there is an information board at the entrance of the system that 
is visible to every driver at the entrance. The information on the board in this 
case is the latest transit t ime of each route, i.e., the t ime taken by the most 
recent vehicle at the destination to travel the entire route for both routes. 
The information of a route is updated when there is a vehicle reaches the 
destination using that route. Also, there are two types of drivers: static and 
dynamic drivers. The static drivers randomly select a route to enter, so they 
are the users who ignore the information provided on the board. The dynamic 
drivers use the information provided. They always choose the route w i th the 
shorter transit t ime at that moment, no matter what the real situation on the 
route is. I f the information is the same for both routes, then the dynamic 
drivers wi l l select a route randomly, just like the static drivers. Note that 
when a new vehicle is not able to enter the desired route due to car blockage 
at the entrance, i t wi l l be deleted and there wi l l be no vehicle entering the 
system in that t ime step. After the selection of a route, both kinds of vehicles 
behave in the same way following the single-lane NS model. The dynamics of 
the vehicles inside the route depends only on the vehicle in front and the car 
density of the route. 
7.1.2 Results 
According to Wahle et al. [86] the fraction of dynamic drivers Sdyn is set to be 
0.5, i.e., at the entrance of the system, the occurrence of dynamic drivers has 
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Figure 7.1: Wahle's two-route scenario. A vehicle has to choose to enter one route 
after Ref. [77]；. 
the probabil i ty of 0.5. The random delay probabil i ty p of the NS dynamics is 
set to be p = 0.25. The maximum speed Vmax in the simulations is taken to 
be 3 cells per t ime step and the length of the route is taken to be L = 2000. 
A t every t ime step at most one vehicle can enter and two vehicles can leave 
the system. From the results of numerical simulations Wahle et al. [86] found 
that the number of vehicles, travel time, and the average speed in each route 
exhibit an oscillatory behavior w i th high amplitude. Such oscillations are due 
to the presence of dynamic drivers. They receive the information, but the 
information provided does not necessarily reflect the real t ime information on 
the route. There is some delay. When a route is announced to be "faster" 
w i th a shorter transit time, the dynamic drivers at the entrance wi l l decide 
to go in that route, then the route becomes crowded near the entrance. Near 
the destination, however, drivers sti l l feel that the route is fast. As a result, 
the information on the board sti l l announces that route is "faster". When 
the number of vehicles increases, the average speed decreases, and the route 
becomes congested. We wi l l t ry to il lustrate this problem in the next section 
and discuss in more detail about the situation. Wahle et al. [86] also studied 
the influence of the dynamic drivers, effects of the length of the routes, and the 
deceleration probability. They also studied some auto-correlation functions for 
the number of cars on a route in the system. 
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7.2 Announcing instantaneous average speed 
model using NS dynamics [87 
7.2.1 Model 
Similar to the scenario studied by Wahle et al., we consider two identical 
routes A and B as described in the previous section ( Sec.7.1.1 ). But now 
the information provided to drivers at the entrance is not the latest transit 
t ime because such information seems not to be very useful to the dynamic 
drivers. We propose to use the instantaneous average speed of each route as 
the information [87]. This information can be achieved by setting cameras to 
monitor the whole or sections of the route. The dynamic drivers wi l l always 
choose the route w i th the higher instantaneous average speed. Again, i f the 
instantaneous average speeds are the same for both routes, then the dynamic 
drivers wi l l select a route randomly. 
As for the static drivers, they ignore the information provided and select 
the route according to their own preferred. In real traffic, most of the drivers 
have their preference in route. We model them as having a probabil i ty q of 
selecting route A, say, and a probabil i ty (1 — q) of selecting route B. For 
q = 0.5, the static drivers behave just like those in the model of Wahle et al. 
86]. After the selection of a route, both static and dynamic drivers wi l l all 
behave in the same way as in the single-lane NS model. 
7.2.2 Results 
First, we study the case of q = 0.5, where the static drivers wi l l select a route 
randomly. The case is similar to announcing the transit t ime model [86]. So 
that we can compare the results of our model wi th the announcing transit t ime 
model to see which information, transit time or instantaneous average speed, 
is better for the road users to minimize their travel time and for efficient road 
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usage. We set the parameters as follows: the length of each route L — 2000, 
the deceleration probabil i ty p — 0.25, the maximum speed Vmax — 3 cells/t ime 
step and the fraction of dynamic drivers Sdyn varies between 0 to 1. Note that 
at every t ime step only one vehicle can enter and two vehicles can leave the 
system, i.e., one vehicle can leave the system on each route. I f a vehicle is 
unable to enter the chosen route, i t w i l l be deleted and no new vehicle enters 
the system in that turn. 
In the simulations, 2 x 10^ t ime steps are used for each run and the system 
typically reaches the steady state after 80,000 t ime steps. For the purpose of 
comparing the effectiveness of the two kinds of information, we first consider 
the results for the case of Sdyn 二 0.5. The results are shown in Fig. 7.2, 
in which the results of announcing transit t ime w i th the same conditions are 
included for comparison. The total number of vehicles in the system is higher 
than that in the announcing transit t ime system. Clearly, the fluctuations in 
the number of vehicles are much less and more vehicles can enter the system. 
The average density of vehicles in the present model is much higher. We found 
that the average transit t ime for each vehicle is about 〜749 for both models. 
The oscillations in the transit t ime have a much lower amplitude, while the 
model of announcing transit t ime has oscillations wi th a higher amplitude. To 
see more clearly the effects of the dynamic drivers in the announcing transit 
t ime model, we now consider the cases of Sdyn = 0.25 and Sdyn = 0.75. From 
Fig. 7.3，the total number of vehicles in the system decreases as Sdyn increases 
and the amplitude of oscillations is also higher. Such effect is due to the effects 
of t ime delay in the information. As the number of dynamic drivers increases, 
more vehicles wi l l choose the "wrong" route due to the delay effect in the 
information, and thus results in a decrease of the flux of the system as shown 
in Fig. 7.4. From Fig. 7.4, the model of announcing instantaneous average 
speed shows that the flux does not depend on the fraction of dynamic drivers 
very much and the model always has a higher flux than the announcing transit 
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Figure 7.2: Transit time and number of vehicles in both routes in the announcing 
instantaneous average speed model and the announcing transit time model. The 
parameters are: Sdyn = 0.5, q = 0.5 and p = 0.25. 
t ime model. We conclude that for q = 0.5, using the instantaneous average 
speed as the information is better than using the latest transit t ime. Note that 
we consider only the flux averaged over both routes in Fig. 7.4, as the routes 
are symmetrical for the case of q = 0.5. 
Next, we study the effects of different values of q for the static drivers. 
In reality, the static drivers wi l l not select a route at random, but instead a 
preferred route is chosen. Therefore q is not equal to 0.5. Since the two routes 
are identical, we only need to study cases wi th q > 0.5. In Fig. 7.5, we show 
the number of vehicles in the two routes corresponding to the cases of g = 0.6 
and q = 0.9, w i th Sdyn 二 0.5 in both cases, where the global information is 
the instantaneous average speed. Clearly, the situation is quite different now. 
As the static drivers tend to crowd onto a particular route, introducing the 
dynamic drivers can improve the performance of the system. Figure 7.6 shows 
the flux as a function of Sdyn in both routes for the cases corresponding to 
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Figure 7.4: The average flux with p = 0.25 and q 二 0.5 against Sdyn in the an-
nouncing instantaneous average speed and transit time models. 
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q = 0.6 and q = 0.9, respectively. For Sdyn = 0, i.e., there are only static 
drivers, the flux of route B reaches 0.1 for q — 0.9. Such flux w i l l reduce the 
overall flux of the system, and the usage of the routes is not effective. As 
Sdyn increases from Sdyn = 0 to Sdyn 二 0.5, the flux increases rapidly. The 
information provided becomes more useful. Note that the global information 
in Fig. 7.6 is the instantaneous average speed. Al though the flux is different 
for different routes, we can consider the average flux of the system to study the 
effect of the two kinds of information. Figure 7.7 shows the averaged flux for 
different values of q and Sdyn- When Sdyn <0.5， the flux is more sensitive to 
Sdyn and q for both models because the behavior of the flux is highly dependent 
on the static drivers' preference. As the number of dynamic drivers increases, 
the information of both kinds can enhance the performance for Sdyn < 0.3. 
Clearly, more dynamic drivers {sdyn > 0.3) in the model of announcing transit 
t ime are not good for the system because of the delay effect in the information 
provided. The flux in the model of announcing instantaneous average speed 
increases as Sdyn increases. Note that for s办„ > 0.3, the flux in the model of 
announcing instantaneous average speed is higher than that in the model of 
announcing the transit t ime for all values of q. 
7.2.3 Discussion 
Note that for the announcing instantaneous average speed model, the flux at 
Sdyn 二 0 (Fig. 7.7) i.e., all static drivers, is a l i t t le bit higher than that at 
Sdyn 0. Here we seem to have a situation where a system wi th information 
not used by drivers performs better than one in which real-time information is 
used. I t is because the static drivers select the route randomly {q = 0.5) and 
i t is an effective way to distribute the vehicles onto the two routes. Since only 
one vehicle can enter the system in each time step , the maximum density can 
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q = 0.9 in the announcing average speed model. 
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be estimated as follows. The average speed of the vehicles [88] is 
^ 二 '^max ~~ P 
二 3 - 0 . 2 5 
二 2.75 
and the probabil i ty that a vehicle can enter the system [89] is, a = 0.75. The 
tota l number of vehicles in the system is then given by L - a/z; ~ 545. As there 
are two routes in the system, the car density in each route ( two routes are 
equivalent) is given by 
_ 545 1 
P 二 2 2000 
二 0.136 vehicles/cell. 
Such density in each route corresponds to the low density regime in NS dy-
namics. Thus the speed of the major i ty of the vehicles are 2 or 3 cells per 
t ime step as a result of the NS dynamics for low car densities. This constancy 
in the vehicle speed leads to the sensitive dependence of the flux on the num-
ber of vehicles, as the flux is given by the product of the vehicle density and 
the speed. The instantaneous average speed is an information for the whole 
route and cannot reflect possible traffic jams near the entrance. This could 
be a possible explanation for the results that the flux w i th Sdyn 二 0 is slightly 
better than that of Sdyn = 1. The density of the whole system depends on the 
parallel updating rules and the mechanism by which cars are introduced into 
the system at the entrance. In real situations, the density of cars in a highway 
is higher than the density in our model because there can be more than one 
vehicle at the entrance waiting to enter the highway at every time step. How-
ever, announcing the instantaneous average speed suppresses the amplitude of 
the oscillations in the number of vehicles, and the mean number of vehicles 
on each route is about 271. This should be compared wi th the announcing 
transit t ime model, for which the mean number of vehicles on each route is 
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only about 240. Thus, the information provided can also enhance the density 
in the system i f the instantaneous average speed is announced instead of the 
transit t ime. There st i l l exists much information on the route which we can 
use as global information. Instantaneous average speed is not the only or the 
best information, we can provide more than one kind of information for the 
road users so that the routes and the information provided are more effectively 
used. 
7.3 Two-route models with global information 
using FI dynamics 
7.3.1 Models 
Basically, the models deal w i th scenario similar to those considered in Sees. 
7.1 and 7.2. Consider two routes, A and B, connecting two places. In every 
t ime step, there is a vehicle wait ing to enter the system and the driver has to 
choose one route to enter. The two routes are identical in nature. So i f there is 
no congestion and both routes are in the same condition, the vehicle can pass 
through the system in the same period of t ime regardless of the route chosen. 
But in reality, some users may prefer one route, say A, or there may be some 
congestion in one route, so the route users have to choose a route according to 
the condition of the routes. 
As in previous CA models, the road is subdivided into cells. Each cell is 
either occupied by at most one vehicle or empty at a given instant of time. 
Each vehicle has its own speed i; G {0,1, •..，Vmax}, where Vmax is the maximum 
speed on the road. The two routes are of the same length L and Vmax- After a 
vehicle enters the route, the motion of the vehicle is described by F I dynamics 
for the microscopic traffic flow wi th the following rules [11]: 
1. Avoid collisions: v{t) — min{vmax, g^p) 
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2. Randomization: w i th a certain probabil i ty p, v{t) — min{vmax — gap) 
3. Movement: x{t + 1) 二 x{t) + v{t) 
where the gap refers to the spacing between two vehicles and x is the posit ion 
of the vehicle. 
There are two types of users: static and dynamic drivers. The static drivers 
have a probabil i ty q of selecting route A and (l — q) of selecting route B . They 
are the users who ignore the information provided. The dynamic drivers use 
the information and make decision according to the information. Note that 
i f a new vehicle is not able to enter the desired route because of congestion 
at the entrance, i t wi l l be deleted and there is no vehicle entering the system 
at that instant of time. A t most one vehicle can enter and two vehicles can 
leave the system at every t ime step. After the selection of route, both types 
of drivers follow the F I dynamics. 
There are two models w i th different kinds of announced information: 
1. Announcing latest transit time model 
Init ial ly, we set the information on the board as 0. When one vehicle 
leaves a route, the driver reports her transit t ime through the route. The 
dynamic drivers wi l l choose the route wi th the shorter latest transit time. 
I f the transit t ime is the same for both routes, a dynamic driver selects 
a route randomly. 
2. Announcing instantaneous average speed model 
The information is the instantaneous average speed of each route. I f 
there is no vehicle in the route, the information is set to be Vmax, the 
maximum speed of the route. The dynamic drivers wi l l always choose the 
route wi th the higher instantaneous average speed. I f the information is 
the same for both routes, a dynamic driver selects a route randomly. 
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7.3.2 Results 
We now present the results of numerical simulations for the two models. The 
parameters are taken to be Vmax = 3, p = 0.25 and L — 2000. Af ter 80000 
t ime steps, both systems reach the steady state. We first consider the case of 
q 二 0.5 for both models. Figures 7.8 and 7.9 show the space-time diagram for 
the announcing latest transit t ime model and the announcing instantaneous 
average speed model. In the calculations, Sdyn — 0.5. From Fig. 7.8, the routes 
of the announcing transit t ime model can be divided into two parts, namely 
the high density and low density parts. There may be some congestion in the 
high density part，while a free flow phase wi l l appear in the low density part. 
Clearly, the routes are not effectively used. I f the high density part appears at 
the entrance, vehicles cannot enter the system leading to a low vehicle density 
in the whole system. For the announcing instantaneous average speed model, 
Fig. 7.9 shows that the routes are almost of the same density. The distr ibut ion 
of vehicles in the routes is very even. Both routes are more effectively used. 
Comparing the two figures indicates that announcing the instantaneous aver-
age speed is a more useful information than the latest transit time. The total 
number of vehicles in the system is also higher in the announcing instantaneous 
average speed model. More explicitly, we plot the total number of vehicles in 
each route against t ime for both models in Fig. 7.10. There exists a period 
of t ime that one route in the announcing transit time model contains more 
vehicles than that of announcing instantaneous average speed. I t is because 
all the dynamic drivers choose the same route if the information indicated that 
the route has a shorter transit time. However, the information does not really 
reflect the actual situation of the system. There is a delay effect. Such de-
layed information makes the route congested wi th dynamic drivers, leading to 
the high density region in Fig. 7.8 in one route associated wi th a low density 
region in the other route. But the total number of vehicles in the system is 
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Figure 7.8: The space-time diagram of the announcing transit time model with 
Vmax = 3, p = 0.25 and L = 2000. Each dot indicates a vehicle in that space at an 
instant of time. 
less than that of the announcing instantaneous average speed model because 
of the congestion at the entrance. Moreover, there is an oscillation in the tran-
sit t ime wi th a higher amplitude. Such oscillations are also due to the delay 
effect of the information. Figure 7.11 shows the transit t ime of each route for 
the two models. Clearly, the oscillations in the transit t ime in the announcing 
latest transit t ime model have a larger amplitude than that in the announcing 
instantaneous speed model. 
We want to study which kind of information is really useful for a two-route 
system. We investigate the effects of the fraction of dynamic drivers in both 
models. We simulate the two models wi th the fraction of dynamic drivers 
Sdyn varying from 0 to 1 and calculate the average flux of the whole system 
as a function of Sdyn. The results are shown in Fig. 7.12. I t is found that as 
Sdyn increases, the flux in the announcing transit t ime model decreases rapidly 
while that of the announcing instantaneous average speed model seems to be 
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Figure 7.9: The space-time diagram of the announcing instantaneous average speed 
model with Vmax = P = 0.25 and L = 2000. 
550 ‘ 1 ‘ 1 丨 I ~ — — ‘ 
~~ ~~ - announcing transit time model 
announcing average speed model 
-A A A A A " 
s • \ j \ j \ j \ / \ 
2 5 。 \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / V V V y � 
150 ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ • ‘ ‘ 
80000 81000 82000 83000 84000 
time step 
Figure 7.10: The number of vehicles on each route as a function of time for the 
announcing instantaneous average speed and transit time models. Other parameters 
are Vmax = 3 and p = 0.25. 
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Figure 7.11: The transit time as a function of time for the announcing instantaneous 
average speed and transit time models. Other parameters are Vmax = 3 andp = 0.25. 
unchanged despite a slight fluctuation. Therefore, announcing the instanta-
neous average speed as the information is better than announcing the latest 
transit t ime, when q = 0.5. 
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Figure 7.12: The average flux for q = 0.5 against Sdyn in the announcing instanta-
neous average speed and transit time models. Other parameters are Vmax = 3 and 
Next we consider cases w i th q / 0.5. I t is because in real traffic, drivers wi l l 
prefer one route, say route A, to another. Since the two routes are identical, 
i t is sufficient to consider cases wi th q > 0.5. Figures 7.13 and 7.14 show 
the space-time diagrams of the two routes for the two models, for q 二 0.9 
and Sdyn — O-l- The flow in the two routes are asymmetric in both models. 
Clearly, the static drivers tend to crowd onto a particular route. In this case, 
introducing dynamic drivers can improve the performance of the system. To 
see the difference in the two routes and the effects of dynamic drivers, we show 
the flux in each route as a function of Sdyn in Fig. 7.15 for cases corresponding 
to q = 0.6 and q = 0.9 of the two models. As Sdyn > 0.5, flow in the two 
routes are no longer the same. The flux of route A is always higher than that 
of route B, since the flux is highly dependent on the number of vehicles on the 
route in both models. To study the cffcct of information provided, the average 
flux of the system as a function of Sdyn for different values of ^ > 0.5 for both 
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Figure 7.13: The space-time diagram of the announcing latest transit time model. 
The parameters are q = 0.9, Sdyn = 0.10, Vmax 二 3 and p = 0.25 . 
models is shown in Fig. 7.16. Much explicit than in Fig. 7.15, i t is observed 
that as more and more dynamic drivers are introduced, the average flux of 
the announcing instantaneous average speed model increases. For Sdyn〉0.4, 
the average flux of announcing the latest transit t ime decreases because the 
information provided is not so useful. The results give similar features as in 
models using the NS dynamics, and the instantaneous average speed represents 
better information than the latest transit time. 
7.3.3 Discussion 
The vehicle density on the routes for both models is sti l l very low. The low 
density is due to the mechanism in which vehicles are allowed to enter the 
system at the entrance. Since there is at most one vehicle entering the system 
and two vehicles leaving the system in one time step, the vehicle density cannot 
be high. Here, we propose a simple mean field theory for the flux as a function 
of Sdyn for the two models with q and Vmax 二 3. Although we do not account 
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Figure 7.14: The space-time diagram of the announcing instantaneous average 
speed model. The parameters are q = 0.9, Sdyn 二 0.10, Vmax = 3 and p — 0.25 . 
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Figure 7.15: The average flux in each route, corresponding to q = 0.6 and q = 0.9, 
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speed models. Other parameters are Vmax = 3 and p = 0.25 • 
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is the probability of random delay in the FI model. 
for al l the details of the system, the following formalism may be a good start ing 
point for developing a complete theory. 
Since we are mainly concerned w i th the flux, we first need to consider how 
the vehicles enter the system at the entrance. Let w be the probabil i ty that a 
vehicle chooses to enter a particular route per t ime step. First consider w = 1, 
i.e., every t ime step there is one vehicle wants to enter the route. As i l lustrated 
in Fig. 7.17, in every t ime step there is at most one vehicle in the first three 
cells of the route. Consider the case that the second cell is occupied by a 
vehicle in the beginning of a period, then in 3 or 4 t ime steps, the situation 
wi l l repeat itself. The flux is (ps = I i f the situation repeats every 3 t ime steps, 
and the flux is (^>4 = | i f the situation repeats every 4 t ime steps. Also, the 
probabil ity for the occurrence of a period of 3 time steps is 
P 3 = p { l - p ) ' ' + p { l - p ) + p ： (7.1) 
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and the probabi l i ty for the occurrence of a period of 4 t ime steps is 
P4 二 （ 1 — ( 7 . 2 ) 
Therefore, the to ta l flux in the route is 
<t> = hPs + 
二 l i ^ - p f ^ l (P(l - Pf + -P)+P) 
= 是 ( 1 1 ) 3 + 臺 ( 1 — ( 1 1 ) 3 ) . 
. I n general, w is not equal to 1 but instead takes on a value w i th in 0 < if； < 1. 
We then have to consider how many vehicles w i l l choose to enter a route for 
the two different situations. Consider the case that the situation repeats every 
4 t ime steps. The scenario is: 
1. There is one vehicle t ry ing to enter the route every t ime step. The 
probabil i ty for this to happen is 
P4,4 = w \ (7.3) 
w i th the corresponding flux (from Fig. 7.17 ) given by 
04,4 = J. (7.4) 
2. There exists a t ime step in which no vehicle wants to enter the route, 
and there are vehicles that want to enter the route in the other three 
t ime steps. The probabil i ty for this to happen is 
(7.5) 
w i th the corresponding flux given by 
3 
^3,4 = J. (7.6) 
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3. There are two t ime steps in which no vehicle wants to enter the route, 
and there are vehicles that want to enter the route in the other two t ime 
steps. The probabil i ty for this to happen is 
= - wY , (7.7) 
w i th the corresponding flux given by 
知4 二是二臺. (7-8) 
4. There is only one t ime step in which a vehicle wants to enter the route. 
The probabil i ty for this to happen is 
Pi,4 = 4 ^ ( 1 — _3， (7.9) 
w i th the corresponding flux given by 
<^1,4 二 I (7.10) 
For the case that the situation repeats every 3 t ime steps, the scenario can 
be analyzed similarly. We have 
1. P3,3 = UJ^  w i th (/)3,3 二 誉， 
2.尸2，3 = — 川 ) w i t h (f)2,3 二 誉， 
3. Pi,3 = 3w(l — w i th 01,3 = 
Averaging over all the possible cases, the average flux in one route using 
F I dynamics wi th Vmax = 3, and random delay probabil i ty p is 
4 3 
(p = PAY! p、•，d p^Yl p、*，3 
i-O 2=0 
= ( 1 _ + 3秘3(1 一一 + 3切2(1 一 一2 + 切(1 _ 一3) 
97/,3 
+ (1 —（1 一 + 2 切 2 ( 1 — 一 + — 一 2 ) 
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As for the two-route system, the probabil i ty and average flux are the same 
in each route since the two routes are identical . The only difference is the 
probabi l i ty w. Let wa be the probabil i ty that a vehicle chooses to enter route 
A and wb be the probabi l i ty that a vehicle chooses to enter route B. Then, 
the to ta l flux of the two-route system is given by 
(t>T = + (j^B) 
= - ( ( 1 一 — 孕 + (1 - (1 - P?)WA{1 — 
+ (1 1 ) 3 — 1 - 〒 + (1 _ ( 1 - P ) > S ( 1 - - f ) ) 
= 去 孕 字） 
+ ( 1 — (1 - p f ) [ w A - X + 秘 f T ) ) . ( 7 . n ) 
First, consider the case w i th q — 0.5. For the announcing latest transit t ime 
model, the number of vehicles in the two routes oscillates w i th a high frequency 
in a period of t ime (see Fig.7.10) since all the dynamic drivers w i l l choose the 
same route during that period. The simplest approximation is to suppose 
^ ^A = Sdyn + 1(1 - Sdyn) (了 12) 
、UJb = 1(1 — Sdyn), 
where the static drivers of fraction (1 — Sdyn) choose a route randomly, as 
q = 0.5. Substituting Eq.(7.12) into Eq.(7.11), we obtain 
1 1 / I I 1 / I _ 
如 = ( ( 5 + i ) 4 + 4 ^ ) 
1 (I. I ^dyn 1 
+ (1 - (1 -們((臺 + 宇 ) - ^ + (全—宇） 
(I _ 
」 2 ； )). (7.13) 
Next we consider the announcing instantaneous average speed model. For 
simplicity, we assume the dynamic drivers choose a route randomly for the 
reason that the instantaneous average speed varies all the time. The static 
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Figure 7.18: The analytical average flux for q = 0.5 as a function of Sdyn in the 
announcing latest transit time and instantaneous average speed models. Other pa-
rameters are Vmax = 3 and p = 0.25 . 
drivers choose a route randomly. Put t ing the two types of drivers together, we 
assume 
i = I Sdyn + 1(1 - Sdyn) (了 工句 
、Wb = \sdyn + - Sdyn)-
Substituting Eq.(7.14) into (Eq.7.11), we obtain 
1 T l4 . l4 -, l3 . 13 
= ( 1 — P ” g + (1 —(1—1^)3)芸. （7.15) 
Figure 7.18 shows the analytical results w i th p = 0.25 for the two models. 
Numerical results are included for comparison. The analytical results give 
qualitative agreements w i th the numerical results. 
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Next, we consider the general case wi th q • 0.5. For the announcing latest 
transit t ime model, since the two routes are not identical, we assume that in 
most of the t ime the dynamic drivers choose route B because the static drivers 
congest in route A. The simplest approximation is to assume 
< - “ 1 - 、 ） (7.16) 
、WB = Sdyn + (1 - q){l - Sdyn), 
where the static drivers of fraction (1 — Sdyn) choose route A w i th probabil i ty 
q. Again, substi tut ing Eq.(7.16) into Eq.(7.11), we obtain 
- (1-"广)4) + (1 - (1 - — qs 一、- i ^ I l f ^ 
+ ( 1 — g + — 购 ( 7 . 1 7 ) 
Next we consider the announcing instantaneous average speed model. For 
simplicity, we assume the dynamic drivers choose a route randomly. The static 
drivers choose a route A w i th probabil i ty q. Put t ing the two types of drivers 
together, we assume 
f 
< '^A = I Sdyn + - Sdyn) 工呂） 
、WB = I Sdyn + (1 - q)(l - Sdyn)-
Substituting Eq.(7.18) into (Eq.7.11), we obtain 
•T = 豆 { ( 1 - 々 ) ( ( " + (豆一 dSdyn) 4 
丄 一 d y n i h W. 、、 ( ’ + (l — 办n))4、、 
+ + (1 - — Sdyn)) 4 )) 
+ ( ’ + (1 1 ) ( 1 — 、 ) ） - ( 糾 1 - f l - 、 ) ) 3 綱 
Figures 7.19 and 7.20 show the analytical results w i th p = 0.25 for the an-
nouncing latest transit t ime model and the announcing instantaneous aver-
age speed model, respectively. Numerical results are included for comparison. 
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The analytical results give qualitative agreements w i th the numerical results. 
There are st i l l some derivations between analytical results and numerical re-
sults which are due to the approximations made in the expressions for wa and 
wb. Better agreement is expected if more accurate expressions for wa and wb 
are used. 
0.5 I ‘ 1 ‘ [ ‘ I ‘ I ‘ 
z r ^ 々 了 . ’ : r " . � � 
X : • / • • I . 
芸 • /• 零 t 
o … / 来 q=0.7 T f \ N \ \ 
ff 0.4 7 • .q=0.8 • I -
o •q=0.9 m 
% ” ——q=0.6( analytical) « ^ 
q=0.7 (analytical) 
q=0.8 (analytical) ， 
0 35 _ q=0.9 (analytical) , \ 
寒 
ir 
0.3 ‘ 1 ‘ 1 ‘ ‘ ‘ 1 ‘——‘~‘ 
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 
®dyn 
Figure 7.19: The analytical average flux for q = {0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9} as a function of 
Sdyn in the announcing latest transit time model. Other parameters are Vmax = 3 
and p — 0.25 . 
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Figure 7.20: The analytical average flux for q — {0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9} as a function of 
Sdyn in the announcing instantaneous average speed model. Other parameters are 
Vmax = 3 and p = 0.25 • 
7.4 Summary 
In summary, we have studied the effects of announcing global information to 
drivers in a two-route system. Numerical simulations have been carried out for 
all the models. We have compared the effects of announcing the latest transit 
t ime w i th announcing the instantaneous average speed as the information pro-
vided to drivers. Two microscopic dynamics, NS dynamics and F I dynamics, in 
the routes are considered. We have found that announcing the instantaneous 
average speed gives a higher flux and the routes are more effectively used. A 
simple mean field theory for the models using F I dynamics is proposed for q 
and Vmax — 3. We have calculated analytically the average flux as a function 
of Sdyn. The results are in qualitative agreement w i th numerical results. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, we have studied two types of systems. The two types of system 
are the minor i ty game (MG) and CA models of traffic flow problems. The 
former is a model in which agents compete to be in the minor i ty group. Some 
variations on the M G have been studied numerically and analytically. The 
latter includes studies on some CA traffic flow models using both the NS and 
F I types of dynamics. Other than numerical simulations, simple mean field 
theories have been developed for the F I dynamics in two models. 
We have studied the effects of using different payoff functions in the M G 
numerically. We have explained the dependence of the SD on m in terms 
of the crowd-anticrowd theory. The numerical results have shown that the 
dependence of the SD on m is the same as in the basic MG. The crowd-
anticrowd cancellation effect was used to explain the robustness of the m-
dependence of the SD. The theoretical results are in good agreement w i th the 
numerical results. 
We have studied numerically a version of the M G implemented in a pop-
ulat ion w i th herd formation and information transmission among agents. I t 
is a more realistic model in that agent's action is affected more by the ones 
he knows. We have introduced short-range interactions among agents through 
the action of imi ta t ing the best-performing agent's action or strategy w i th in 
the connected neighbors. Simulation results have indicated that imitat ions 
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give a better performance of the population as a whole for small values of 
m. We have found that moderate imi ta t ion can be beneficial, while too much 
imi ta t ion is harmful. 
For CA traffic flow models, we have studied a one-lane traffic flow model 
w i th anticipation effects using the F I dynamics. Both numerical and analytical 
results have been reported. We have incorporated the anticipation of the 
change in the car spacing ahead in the determination of speed of the cars in 
each t ime step. The results showed an enhanced traffic flux as compared to 
the basic F I model. A simple mean field theory has been developed for the 
fundamental diagram and the results are in good agreement w i th numerical 
results. 
Two-route traffic flow models w i th global information announced to the 
drivers have also been studied. Based on the information, drivers choose to 
enter one of the two possible routes from a start ing point to a destination. Nu-
merical results of both F I and NS dynamics have been reported. Two types of 
information, the most recent transit times of the routes and the instantaneous 
average speeds on the routes, have been studied. The numerical results sug-
gested that announcing the instantaneous average speeds is more efficient in 
terms of the usage of the routes. A simple mean field theory has been proposed 
for the model using F I dynamics. 
Both types of system have attracted much attention in recent years. These 
models can be further modified to include more details of the behavior of the 
agents or the drivers, to include more realistic considerations. 
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